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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES IN OUTSOURCING SALES AND MARKETING FUNCTIONS:
A RESOURCE-ADVANTAGE PERSPECTIVE IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSUMER PACKAGED GOODS
BY
BELGIN UNAL
July 2011
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Dr. Naveen Donthu

Major Academic Unit:

Marketing Department

Outsourcing refers to contracting out the functions to a third party instead of conducting them in-house.
The main contribution of this dissertation is to develop and test a model of successful outsourcing in the
accomplishment of headquarters selling task. Specifically, it intends to (a) provide a theoretical framework
for outsourcing partnership performance, (b) explore the potential complementarities construct in the
context of a dyadic outsourcing relationship, (c) examine the role of learning dynamic capabilities in
turning potential complementarities into outsourcing success, and (d) explicate the role of structural social
capital as an antecedent to learning dynamic capability construct . The conceptual framework of the model
is based on the resource-advantage theory which posits that resources, potential complementarities and
dynamic capabilities are explicated as sub-constructs. The pool of respondents who are the practicing
managers of outsourcing in the consumer packaged goods industry was used to test the hypothesized
relationships. The findings showed that the learning dynamic capabilities construct is the most important
factor affecting in the outsourcing partnership performance in the context of headquarters selling task. The
task-related resources of the outsourcer had a significant positive effect on potential complementarities.
However, the positive effect of the outsourcee‟s task-related resources on potential complementarities was
not significant. Likewise, the positive effect of the potential complementarities on the outsourcing
partnership performance did not emerge as significant. The effect of structural social capital of the
outsourcer had a significant but negative influence on learning dynamic capabilities. The positive effect of
structural social capital of the outsourcee on learning dynamic capabilities and the moderating role of
learning dynamic capabilities were found to be insignificant.
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ABSTRACT
THE ROLE OF DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES IN OUTSOURCING SALES AND
MARKETING FUNCTIONS: A RESOURCE-ADVANTAGE PERSPECTIVE IN THE
CONTEXT OF CONSUMER PACKAGED GOODS
by
Belgin Unal
July 2011
Committee Chair: Dr. Naveen Donthu
Major Department: Marketing

Outsourcing refers to contracting out the functions to a third party instead of
conducting them in-house. The main contribution of this dissertation is to develop and
test a model of successful outsourcing in the accomplishment of headquarters selling
task. Specifically, it intends to (a) provide a theoretical framework for outsourcing
partnership performance, (b) explore the potential complementarities construct in the
context of a dyadic outsourcing relationship, (c) examine the role of learning dynamic
capabilities in turning potential complementarities into outsourcing success, and (d)
explicate the role of structural social capital as an antecedent to learning dynamic
capability construct . The conceptual framework of the model is based on the resourceadvantage theory which posits that resources, potential complementarities and dynamic
capabilities are explicated as sub-constructs. The pool of respondents who are the
practicing managers of outsourcing in the consumer packaged goods industry was used to
test the hypothesized relationships. The findings showed that the learning dynamic
capabilities construct is the most important factor affecting in the outsourcing partnership
13

performance in the context of headquarters selling task. The task-related resources of the
outsourcer had a significant positive effect on potential complementarities. However, the
positive effect of the outsourcee‟s task-related resources on potential complementarities
was not significant. Likewise, the positive effect of the potential complementarities on
the outsourcing partnership performance did not emerge as significant. The effect of
structural social capital of the outsourcer had a significant but negative influence on
learning dynamic capabilities. The positive effect of structural social capital of the
outsourcee on learning dynamic capabilities and the moderating role of learning dynamic
capabilities were found to be insignificant.

14

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
Outsourcing is defined as “the process by which a corporation, a governmental
agency or another business entity subcontracts to a third party” (Gilbert 1993, p.7).
Outsourcer is the firm contracting out the function to the third party (third party is called
outsourcee (Ukidwe and Bakshi 2005)). Although the phenomenon itself is quite old, the
outsourcing concept has only gained prominence in the 1970‟s (Cronk and Sharp 1995).
In order to overcome the inefficiencies, companies preferred to outsource the
functions which are not performed efficiently in house (Stigler 1951). In the early days
of outsourcing, businesses usually contracted out the functions that were relatively
unimportant or simple, but time consuming (Anderson and Trinkle 2005). Today,
outsourcing is being used for a wide range of functions by both small and large firms.
There is an increasing trend toward outsourcing the marketing operations. Forrester
Research estimates that typically 53% of businesses outsource more than half of their
marketing activities (McGovern and Quelch 2005). Many companies such as Sony,
American Express and Best Buy are outsourcing their marketing-related activities with
the goal of “increasing critical left-brain marketing expertise” (McGovern and Quelch
2005, p.26). The functions that are most frequently outsourced are production, computer
systems, logistical systems, accounting, sales and marketing functions (Anderson and
Trinkle 2005).
While efficiency is still one of the important considerations in outsourcing
decisions, recently effectiveness has also emerged as an equally important consideration.
Based on the core competency arguments (Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Porter 1985),
companies desire to outsource all non-core activities which other companies can perform

15

more effectively. For example, Goodyear had outsourcing arrangements with Exel (3PLthird party logistics provider) which allowed them to focus on their stronger skill sets and
to benefit from the stronger strategic resources that Exel had in distribution (Maloney
2004). The belief that that customer care would be hurt by outsourcing is increasingly
being challenged and, in fact, there are some outsourcees who are more skilled in upselling and cross selling activities than their outsourcers (Marek 2005). Further, in depth
interviews with executives of some manufacturers suggest that effectiveness is now
equally important as efficiency when making outsourcing decisions (Parvatiyar et al.
2006).
In the outsourcing literature various theories have been used to explain the
decision to outsource, such as the transaction cost theory (e.g. Anderson 1985) and
resource-based theories (e.g. Lacity 1998). Transaction cost theory (Williamson 1975;
1985) examines the efficiency costs of performing a function in-house versus contracting
out. However, this approach is limited in that outsourcing is no longer solely considered
for cost minimization but it is increasingly considered as a very important strategic tool
for many firms (Sanders et al. 2007) enabling firms to access the technical skills and
newly acquired technologies of the outsourcee (Lacity and Willcocks 1998). Therefore,
companies that outsource solely due to financial reasons may overlook the long term
gains by focusing on the short term per unit cost reductions (Lynch 2005).
Alternatively, the resource-based reasons of outsourcing can provide long term
gains by accessing resources such as technical know-how, assets and expertise (Sanders
et al. 2007). According to this view (Barney 1991; 1999) companies should focus on
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their core competencies and outsource for the functions that they are not capable of
performing efficiently themselves.
Resource-oriented approaches such as the resource-based view (i.e. Barney 1991)
and resource-advantage theory (i.e. Hunt and Morgan 1995) provide valuable insights to
outsourcing relationships although there are some marked differences between the two in
terms of their focus. The latter focuses on categorization of resources and incorporation
of dynamic capability view (i.e. Teece and Pisano 1994). The dynamic capability
perspective states that successful firms are the ones that are swift at redeploying and
coordinating resources under changing environmental conditions (Teece, Pisano and
Shuen 1997). A firm that is less capable at performing a task will choose to outsource
that function. This study is rooted in the resource-based theories and aims to identify the
role of dynamic capabilities in generating high performance with combined resource
assortments of the firms.

Purpose of the Study
Most studies in marketing focus on the decision to outsource under the transaction
costs, agency problems or resource-based considerations. In a departure from former
studies, this study examines the underlying processes that affect coordination and
performance outcomes of the parties that are already formed. Using the resourceadvantage theory as its theoretical basis, the study aims to explain the conditions that lead
to higher performance in outsourced sales and marketing functions.
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Contributions of the Study
The study provides valuable insights to both outsourcing and channels literature
concerning dyadic relationships. Based on resource-advantage theory of the firm and
focusing exclusively on the resources construct, the study proposes and tests a model
which clearly differentiates between static resources and dynamic capabilities by
specifically identifying where the role of dynamic capabilities actually starts.
Another contribution is in the introduction of the construct of potential
complementarities and provision of alternative measures for several other constructs in
the model. In a dyadic relationship, the combination of task-related resources of each
party (potential complementarities) can be an indicator of good performance, but only to
a certain extent. How the two parties can jointly mobilize these complementarities via
their dynamic capabilities can actually provide a better prediction of performance
outcomes. The study captures this process by examining and conceptualizing how
optimal level of performance can be achieved in inter-firm settings such as outsourcing.
A final contribution is the introduction of a new classification for resources as:
1) task-related and 2) social capital. Task-related resources are similar to transactional
aspect of exchange where the exchange is discrete as in the basic form of outsourcing.
On the other hand, social capital concerns the relational aspect of exchange where
behavioral factors such as trust, norms, shared language become obvious as in the
alliances.
Although the proposed model is in the context of outsourcing, it is generalizable
to any other dyadic relationship where parties come together to jointly perform certain
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tasks. Moreover, the proposed model is a step toward understanding the relational
aspects that are often neglected in outsourcing relationships.
Next chapter provides a literature review on outsourcing and related theoretical
concepts. In chapter 3, the conceptual and empirical models are presented. Chapter 4
describes the methodology and chapter 5 explains the data analysis and results. Final
chapter discusses the implications, limitations and future directions of the study.
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter examines several concepts and theories from the literature to form
the basis of the proposed conceptual model. In the first section, outsourcing is introduced
as a concept with selected definitions from the literature. Second section provides
explanations for two important theories used in outsourcing literature, namely transaction
cost theory and resource-based theory. Outsourcing studies that choose to use resourcebased view as a basis are also provided as examples. Next, the evolution of the resourcebased view and its relation to differential performance is explored. Finally, the notion of
dynamic capabilities and its hypothesized role between potential complementarities and
performance is discussed.

Outsourcing Defined
Several different definitions are offered for the concept of outsourcing in the
literature. Harrigan (1985) explained outsourcing as a make or buy decision which
entails producing goods or services within one‟s own strategic business units (SBUs) or
buying from other SBUs that are already producing. Quinn and Hilmer (1994) stated that
outsourced activities should be the ones in which the firm has no special capabilities or
strategic need. Following the core competency argument (Prahalad and Hamel 1994), a
firm should concentrate on its core competencies and outsource the rest (Quinn and
Hilmer 1994). Similarly, Quelin and Duhamel (2003) defined outsourcing as a long term
contract with an external supplier for the accomplishment of a task. Ross, Dalsace and
Anderson (2005) explored the outsourcing concept in the sales field and decision to
outsource is whether to own or rent the sales force.
20

Espino- Rodriguez and Padron-Robaina (2006, p.52) defined outsourcing as “a
strategic decision that entails the external contracting of determined non-strategic
activities or business processes necessary for the manufacture of goods or the provision
of services by means of agreements or contracts with higher capability firms to undertake
those activities or business processes, with the aim of improving competitive advantage.”
The above definition has three important implications according to Ray, Barney
and Muhanna (2004). First, as outsourcing is a strategic decision of the firm, it is directly
related to competitive advantage. Second, the firm should decide on the activities that are
suitable for outsourcing and then select the outsourcees that have better resources and
capabilities performing those activities. Third, incorporating processes as well as
resources will provide a complete picture as resources should be exploited through
processes to be competitive advantage (Ray et al. 2004).

Major Theories of Outsourcing
Transaction Cost Theory
The outsourcing concept has been studied in various contexts such as "make-orbuy" (Hendrick and Moore 1985), vertical integration (Coase 1937) and transaction cost
analysis (Williamson 1985; Heide and John 1990) (Sanders et al. 2007).
Transaction cost theory is widely used in considering the outsourcing option in any
kind of a task or a function (Cheon, Grover and Teng 1995; Grover, Cheon and Teng 1994;
Wang 2002). Transaction cost theory examines the efficiency of choosing between different
governance structures such as contracting out or vertical integration (Rindfleisch and Heide
1997). When a function is performed within the company, it is called vertical integration,
21

hierarchy or in-house, whereas the function performed outside the company is named market
governance or contracting out (outsourcing).
Transaction cost theory posits that the governance structure (outsourcing or in-house)
which minimizes the sum of production and transaction costs is the one to be preferred
(Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). The costs of developing specifications, designing the product,
and performing the other activities involved in moving to a production-ready component are
referred to as production costs (Rosenau 1990; Williamson 1985). The costs of performing
development activities are referred to as production costs (Williamson 1991). For instance,
the prophecies such as labor, capital and materials incurred while executing the marketing
function can all be classified as production costs (Williamson 1985).
As suggested by general production theory, the costs of performing development
tasks may be subject to economies of scale and to experience effects (Thompson and Formby
1993). The economies of scale are the most stressed factor in the production cost theory
(Bello, Lohtia and Dant 1999). The firms operating under high economies of scale have
lower average production costs as they have specialized human and technology capital
(Harvey 1983). When a firm operates on a large production volume, the employees are
efficient in reducing costs by focusing on a few tasks at a time (Bello et al. 1999). Therefore,
companies while selecting their outsourcee consider and compare the outsourcee which will
have the highest economies of scale providing reduction in costs.
Transaction cost theory defines transaction costs as those of managing the
development process between the parties (i.e., outsourcer and outsourcee) (Williamson
1991). For instance, the prophecies such as writing, monitoring, and enforcing contracts
between the outsourcer and the outsourcee are named as transaction costs (Williamson 1985).
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The basic premise is that if the transaction costs of contracting out to a third party (i.e.,
outsourcee) outweigh the production cost advantages then firms should execute the
marketing function in-house (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997).
Transaction costs can be high due to three reasons: safeguarding, adaptation and
measurement problems (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). They are the result of specificity of
assets, environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty, respectively (Rindfleisch and
Heide 1997). First, highly specific assets may cause a problem as they have of little value
outside the contractual relationship between the outsourcer and the outsourcee and may result
in one of the two parties‟ opportunistically exploitative behaviors (Rindfleisch and Heide
1997). Second, environmental uncertainties (i.e. volume and technological uncertainties)
may cause increase in transaction costs due to difficulties in adapting contractual agreements
ex ante (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). Third, behavioral uncertainty may affect transaction
costs as measuring the contractual performance of the outsourcee ex post is difficult
(Rindfleisch and Heide 1997).
Therefore, from a governance cost perspective, outsourcing is appropriate for a
marketing function that does not pose any safeguarding, measurement and adaptation
problem for the outsourcer in terms of applying contractual terms. For instance, a
manufacturer may choose to outsource its routine call center function to an outsourcee that is
based in a low wage country. Thus, it experiences a reduction in call center expenses
(production costs) while not incurring monitoring expenses (transaction costs) for this easily
measured marketing function.
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Resource-Based View
Resource-based theories have been used to provide effectiveness based
explanation for outsourcing (Grover et al. 1994; Teng, Cheon and Grover 1995; Lacity
1998). Resource-based view (Barney 1991), considers the resources and capabilities of
the firm as the source of the competitive advantage. A firm‟s resources are categorized
into three categories; physical (e.g., equipment, building and access to raw materials),
human (e.g., experience, intelligence and relationships) and organizational (e.g.,
planning, controlling and coordinating systems) (Barney 1991).
These resources and capabilities provide the firm a sustained competitive
advantage as long as they are valuable, rare, hard to imitate and hard to substitute
(Barney 1991). Moreover, since the creation of these capabilities is not easy, not all the
firms can possess them for various reasons. First, creating capabilities may depend on
certain historical advantage that is no longer available; the so-called “being at the right
place at the right time” effect (Barney 1991). Second, that certain capability may be path
dependent meaning that it requires long-term learning process, such as acquiring
expertise through long term relationships (Barney 1991). Third, capability may be
embedded in the complexities of social factors such as reputation, culture and
trustworthiness of the firm (Barney 1991). Fourth, capabilities of the firm can be
causally ambiguous which cause difficulty in creating them (Barney 1991). Considering
these factors, a firm may not easily create these capabilities on its own (Barney 1991).
According to the resource-based view, firms should either own or have access to
these capabilities in order to gain sustained competitive advantage. In case of a
restrictive institutional environment (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002), owning the firm
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that possesses those capabilities by acquiring it, or by joint venture, may not be possible.
In some cases, even if the institutional environment allows ownership, the ownership may
impede the dynamics and deter the acquired firm from functioning as it did before the
acquisition (Barney 1999). Therefore, the only way a firm can acquire these capabilities
is through outsourcing the function to the firm that is already equipped with those
capabilities.
As a result, firms that want to gain sustained competitive advantage through
acquiring effective capabilities choose to outsource some of their marketing and sales
functions to meet their strategic objectives such as gaining strategic market access,
superior competitive position, building customer partner relationships and entering new
markets.
Espino- Rodriguez and Padron-Robaina (2006) in their recent review on
outsourcing recommended the adoption of resource-based view as a powerful theoretical
tool for explaining outsourcing relations. Especially in management and information
systems literature, there are several studies that have successfully examined the effects of
outsourcing on performance from a resource-based view.
Lai et al. (2008) examined the firms that are outsourcing their logistics activities.
In this case, outsourcees are called third-party logistics (3PL). The study supported the
relationship between 3PL‟s technology capability and three dimensions of competitive
advantage which are cost advantage, service variety advantage and service quality
advantage. Gilley and Rasheed (2000) studied the relationship between organizational
reliance on outsourcing and firm performance. Although they did not find direct
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relationship between outsourcing and performance, moderating effects of firm strategy
and environmental dynamism were supported.
Gilley, Greer and Rasheed (2004) analyzed the relationship between outsourcing
of human resource activities and performance of the firm. They have found supportive
results for this relationship however the moderating effect of firm size was unconvincing.
Wang et al. (2008) by taking a resource-based perspective observed the
complementary role of firm‟s information technology capability in the value creation of
information technology outsourcing. They concluded that firms with superior IT
capability enhanced their value more by outsourcing.
Based on the above discussion, this study has chosen to use the resource-based
theories as the underlying conceptual framework.

Resource-Based Theories for Differential Performance
In today‟s competitive environment, most of the companies are aware that a
strategy based solely on efficiencies does not guarantee high financial or behavioral
outcomes. The reduction in production costs or efficiently defining contractual terms that
will minimize transaction costs are only a part of a complex strategy. Nowadays, the
differentiating point becomes the value added by the outsourcee, namely, quality
execution of the marketing function.
Early works of several researchers that are based on resource-based view (Barney
1991) take a static perspective (Newbert 2007). The resources that a firm has are
considered to be its main source of competitive position. However, resource possession
(resource) and resource exploitation (dynamic capabilities) are two different contributors
26

of competitive advantage (Mahoney and Pandain 1992). Attention to processes aspect of
competitive advantage results in Barney‟s reframed resource based view (VRIO), which
suggest that firms should be organized in a manner to exploit these resources that are
rare, valuable and inimitable (Barney 1997).
Building on Barney, Teece et al. (1997, p.516) explain the notion of dynamic
capability as “firm‟s ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external
competences to address rapidly changing environments”. It has been shown that the
firms that are successful in the competitive market are the ones that can respond to
changing environmental conditions with rapid production innovations, by effectively
coordinating and redeploying competencies and processes (Teece et al. 1997). This view
points out the important role of strategic management in adaptation, integration and
reconfiguration of skills as well as resources and processes in an organization (Teece et
al. 1997).
When we compare resource-based view with the “dynamic capability approach”,
we observe that resource-based view focuses on resources whereas dynamic capability
framework considers processes (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). According to dynamic
capability framework (Teece et al.1997), processes are the ways things are performed.
Therefore, they are related to concepts such as knowledge sharing routines, learning,
coordination, integration and reconfiguration.
Dynamic capability framework does not only examine asset specificity as the sole
determinant of competitive advantage but also considers the dynamic processes that are
in effect to exploit these resources in an integrated and coordinated way. According to
this view, knowledge sharing routines, best practices and complementary resources will
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result not only in valuable outcomes but also the flexibilities in those processes will
determine how the firm adapts to changing environments (Teece et al. 1997). Strategic
decisions of managers as well as the mechanisms through which these processes are
controlled and planned are important in this framework. Teece et al. (1997) stated that,
unique combination of these resources through coordinated processes will generate
outcomes that are difficult to imitate. Thus, this will, in return, provide sustained
competitive advantage for the firm.
The latest version of resource-based theories in marketing is resource-advantage
theory (Hunt and Morgan 1995). The resource-advantage theory is rooted in models such
as resource-based view (Barney 1991), dynamic capability (Teece and Pisano 1994),
heterogeneous-demand theory (Alderson 1957), competitive-advantage theory (Porter
1985), evolutionary economics (Hodgson 1993) and competence perspective (Foss 1993)
(Hunt, Lambe and Wittmann 2002) . As it draws its logic from several theories, it has
been proposed as an integrative model for explaining alliance success (Hunt et al. 2002).
Firms can create superior customer value and superior performance by joining
with other firms that have resources complementing their resources (Teece 1988).
Superior is defined as being more or better than a reference point (Hunt and Morgan
1997). This reference point can be based on time (e.g. compared to last year), competitor
or industry average performance (Hunt and Morgan 1997). Due to globalization and
technological advances, mergers, alliances and acquisitions are viable options to succeed
in the intensely competitive markets (Cushman and Dyer 1995). In many ways
outsourcing resembles alliances. In both cases, parties are engaged in collaborative
efforts to achieve mutual goals that are difficult to achieve alone (Lambe, Spekman and
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Hunt 2002; Day 1995). Therefore, resource-advantage theory is a valuable theoretical
source to explain outsourcing success.
Resource-advantage theory emphasizes the importance of relational factors in
alliance success (Hunt et al. 2002). Trust, cooperation, commitment, shared values,
keeping promises and communication are the characteristics that foster alliance success
(Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Morgan and Hunt 1994). These characteristics are also in
line with the premises of the social capital theory (Adler and Kwon 2002; Nahapiet and
Ghoshal 1998; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998).
Innovation plays a crucial role in gaining competitive advantage, as well as in
resource-advantage theory. Resource-advantage theory regards renewal competencies as
central to proactive innovation (Hunt and Arnett 2003). Renewal competencies are
described as “dynamic capabilities” in Teece and Pisano (1994). Dynamic capabilities
are socially complex and interconnected (Hunt and Arnett 2003). They enable the firms
to foresee the unmet or changing wants and decide on required resources that should be
acquired, developed or created to meet those wants (Hunt and Arnett 2003).
According to resource-advantage theory, “demand is heterogeneous across and
within industries, and dynamic…Competition is not perfect and is disequilibriumprovoking….Superior financial performance is the firm‟s main objective and the role of
the management is to recognize, understand, create, select, and modify strategies” (Hunt
1997, p.62). This premise coincides with the logic of dynamic capability framework.
Different from the resource-based view, resources here are categorized as
“financial (e.g., cash reserves and access to financial markets), physical (e.g., plant, raw
materials and equipment), legal (e.g., trademarks and licenses), human (e.g., the skills
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and knowledge of individual employees), organizational (e.g., competences, controls,
policies and culture), informational (e.g., knowledge about consumers, competitors, and
technology) and relational (e.g., relationships with competitors, suppliers, employees, and
customers)” and “the firm‟s resources are heterogeneous and imperfectly mobile” (Hunt
1997, p.64).
According to resource-advantage theory, heterogeneity in resources explains firm
diversity (Hunt 1997). As each firm has different resource assortments, firms should
seek for other firms that have higher level of resources whenever their resource level is
low (Levin and McDonald 2006). In other words, they should search for complementary
resources. Complementary resources are the ones that complete one another‟s resource
assortments (Das and Tang 2000). For instance, Ford benefited from manufacturing and
product development expertise of Mazda whereas Mazda from finance and international
marketing expertise of Ford (Hunt 1997). Therefore, complementary resources are the
means to access the resources that one does not own (Hunt et al. 2002).
On the other hand, idiosyncratic resources are created during two firms are
coming together to establish a task. As they are usually unique to the relationship, they
may have little value outside of the relationship (Jap 1999; Hunt 2000). However, this
uniqueness enables competitive advantage. It has been shown that both complementary
and idiosyncratic resources promote alliance success (Jap 1999).
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The Role of Dynamic Capabilities in the Relationship between Potential
Complementarities and Performance
Resource-based theories recognize that access to many resources and capabilities
are outside firm‟s boundaries (Doz and Hamel 1998; Barney 1999). Therefore,
partnership between firms through joint ventures, alliances or outsourcing help them
access to complementary resources. In other words, accessing to complementary
resources motivates firms to enter into collaborative arrangements (Teece 1996; Harrison
et al. 2001). According to the complementarity theory, complementary resources
increase the value of an organizational resource (Milgrom and Roberts 1995). Thus, Das
and Teng (2000) stated that joining forces with other firms provide competitive
advantage. Also, Grant (1991) suggested outsourcing is a remedy when internal
resources are scarce.
When two firms collaborate, such as by outsourcing, their complementary
resources require a certain level of coordination (Stieglitz and Heine 2007). Coordination
is handling the task interdependencies (Malone and Crowston 1994). For some tasks, the
coordination may require fewer arrangements whereas for others, it may require complex
decisions.
We define potential complementarity as the degree of complementarity between
the tasks of two firms without any further arrangements. Nevertheless, depending on the
characteristics of the task and the resources of the firms, additional arrangements may be
required.
Thompson (1967) acknowledges this coordination problem by arguing that
interdependencies between tasks increase the complexity of arrangements to be made.
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Task interdependence refers to the degree to which each firm is dependent on one another
to accomplish the task (Kiggundu 1981). According to Thompson (1967) there are three
kinds of interdependencies: pooled, sequential and reciprocal. In pooled
interdependence, each firm contributes by its own right, each contribution is necessary
and the common point is the final task (Thompson 1967). In sequential interdependence,
one task is an input to the other, therefore there is temporal order, whereas reciprocal
interdependence can be considered as a cyclic version of sequential interdependence
where one output becomes the input to the other and vice versa (Thompson 1967).
Van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig (1976) expand Thompson‟s (1967) work by
introducing the concept of team interdependence where „„work is undertaken jointly by
unit personnel who diagnose, problem-solve and collaborate in order to complete the
work. In team work flow, there is no measurable temporal lapse in the flow of work
between unit members, as there is in sequential and reciprocal cases; the work is acted
upon jointly and simultaneously by unit personnel at the same point in time‟‟ (Van de
Ven et al. 1976, p.325).
Building on Van de Ven et al. (1976), Kumar, Van Fenema and Von Glinow
(2009) develop an extended typology of interdependencies in order to address the
limitations. They introduce the notions of integration interdependence, hand-offs and
stickiness (Kumar et al. 2009). In pooled interdependence, activities are performed
independently and actors are not concerned about outcomes of each activity, whereas in
integration interdependence each actor should be concerned about each sub activity as
there is a need for fitting of the outcome of the activities (Kumar et al. 2009). Therefore,

32

they place integration interdependence between sequential and reciprocal
interdependence in the interdependence intensity scale (Kumar et al. 2009).
Kumar et al. (2009) use the term hand-offs as a reference to “technically separable
interface”. The interface is defined as “the point where control of the work object is
actually transferred from the preceding activity A at one location to the succeeding
activity B at another location” (Kumar et al. 2009, p.652). At the point of hand-offs, the
work transfer includes the object and information about the object. The information
about the status of the object can be either implicitly (e.g. observation) or “explicitly (e.g.
packing slip) communicated “(Kumar et al. 2009, p.652). Stickiness is defined as the
cost of transferring a unit of information to the information seeker (Von Hippel 1994).
Kumar et al. (2009) extend Von Hippel (1994)‟s definition of stickiness by considering
the dynamic aspect of it which is due to interactions between actors, changing
perceptions, innovations and moving people. Stickiness tends to be low when the task is
certain, simple and easy to codify (Kumar et al. 2009). This revised typology aids in
understanding “globally distributed, complex and increasingly knowledge-intensive”
tasks (Kumar et al. 2009, p.646).
As lack of coordination between tasks results in mismatch in supply and demand,
it causes inefficiencies and poor performance (Ho and Tang 2004). Successful alignment
between tasks reduces task uncertainty and eliminates potential functional problems
(Sethi 2000). Therefore, close alignment of tasks enhances performance (Bharadwaj,
Bharadwaj and Bendoly 2007).
Dynamic capability construct has been defined as “processes to integrate,
reconfigure, gain and release resources- to match and even create market change”
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(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, p.1107). Thus, competitive advantage is strictly contingent
upon firm‟s ability to develop dynamic capabilities and dynamic capabilities are the
ability to coordinate and reorganize resources (Dyer and Nobeoka 2000; Griffith and
Harvey 2001; Song et al. 2005). Dynamic capabilities act as facilitator to potential
complementarities in optimally coordinating them to achieve high performance.
When two firms collaborate on a certain task, due to the characteristics of the task
and existing resource deployments of each of the firms, complex arrangements may be
needed to resolve task interdependencies. Dynamic capabilities are the firm‟s ability to
make those arrangements so that they optimally coordinate the resource-task
interdependencies.
In turbulent environments, importance of dynamic capabilities is more evident as
they are less likely to be imitated by other firms and help firms achieve competitive
advantage (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).
In order to assess the importance of dynamic capabilities, we need to understand
the motives behind firm‟s willingness as well as ability to make use of or create dynamic
capabilities. The firms‟ willingness may be more likely to depend on achievement of
mutual goals such as profits. On the other hand, their ability is constrained by each
others‟ relational resources that can be explored under the notion of social capital.
Social capital is a relational resource that is obtained through a network of social
relationships (Baker 1990; Coleman 1990). Social capital is a multidimensional construct
with three components: structural, relational and cognitive (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).
The structural component refers to pattern of ties and connections between actors (Burt
1992). The issues related to structural component of social capital are network ties,
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network configuration, and the appropriable organization (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).
Network ties are very central to outsourcing decisions as they are related to access to
resources (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). Network configuration refers to overall
configuration of relational ties and appropriable organization explores the ways relational
ties can be transferred from one social setting to another (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).
For instance, the degree of transferability of relational ties a firm has from firm level to
the outsourcing relationship.
The second component of social capital, the relational component, considers
issues such as trust, norms, obligation and identification (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).
Trust is defined as accepting the susceptibility toward another party (Nahapiet and
Ghoshal 1998). In the outsourcing context, if each party trusts one another, they will be
more willing to share information, invest on idiosyncratic resources and utilize dynamic
capabilities. Norms are the degree of consent in the social system, whereas obligation
refers to being committed to carry out some activity (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). To
the extent that outsourcing relationship has well defined norms and both parties are
obliged to carry out the functions, better performance results are likely. Identification is
achieved when individuals see themselves as part and reflection of the group (Nahapiet
and Ghoshal 1998). In the outsourcing context, if each firm can identify itself with one
another, they will be willing to achieve mutual goals and forgo short term opportunistic
gains.
The cognitive component is the third component of social capital. It involves
issues such as shared codes, shared language and shared narratives (Nahapiet and
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Ghoshal 1998). When both parties share common codes and languages, their ability to
access to information and people would be much more efficient and effective.
To sum, social capital plays a crucial role in facilitating resource exchange
(Gabbay and Zuckerman 1998), reducing turnover rates (Krackhardt and Hanson 1993),
creation of intellectual capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998), strengthening supplier
relations (Baker 1990) and inter-firm learning (Kraatz 1998).
Social capital is found to be helpful in understanding the integration and
recombination of resources (Blyler and Coff 2003). Social capital is an antecedent to
knowledge integration (Grant 1996). Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) stated that social ties
facilitate resource exchanges which in return advance innovation. Moreover, it has been
argued that in the absence of social capital resources stay unconnected and opportunities
are unutilized (Blyler and Coff 2003). Finally, Blyler and Coff (2003) proposed social
capital as a necessary condition for dynamic capability.
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CHAPTER 3 – MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES

Conceptual Model and Propositions
Resource-advantage theory stresses the importance of heterogeneous firm
resources and their immobility (Hunt 2001). In the case of nations, some have
comparative advantage in some resources and others do not, and that is where the
benefits of trade come into place (Hunt 2001). Trade allows for exchange of resources
one party does not have and in return the other party gains monetary value. In the same
manner, some firms are competent at performing some tasks better than others due to
their resource assortments. Alliances help firms combine their resource assortments and
perform better in the competition (Levin and McDonald 2006). Competitive advantage is
gained through efficiently and/or effectively deploying those resources (Hunt 2001).
Resources are not restricted to land, labor and capital but “financial, physical,
legal, human, organizational, informational, and relational” resources are included in the
definition of resources in resource-advantage theory (Hunt 2001, p.529). Resources that
are valuable, rare, inimitable and not substitutable are the ones that promote success
(Barney 1991).
Resource-advantage theory also stresses the relational factors view (Hunt et al.
2002) in the success of partnerships such as alliances. According to the relational view,
not all the exchanges are transactional, and relational aspects such as trust, cooperation,
keeping promises by strengthening the relationship foster business success (Hunt et al.
2002). Under the resource categories of resource-advantage theory, relational and
organizational resources represent the relational view factor whereas the remaining
resources are more relevant to transactional aspect of exchange. Thus, those transaction37

related resources are called task-related resources in our conceptualization and they are
comprised of financial, legal, human, and informational resources.
When two firms join forces in the form of an alliance or an outsourcing
relationship, two kinds of resources become critical: complementary resources and
idiosyncratic resources (Hunt et al. 2002). Idiosyncratic resources are created through the
formed relationship and have little value outside of it (Jap 1999). However, they are
unique to the relationship and they are difficult to imitate in creating a competitive
advantage. Complementary resources complete one and other‟s resource assortments
(Das and Teng 2000). Thus, both parties benefit from acquiring the resources that they
do not have by using the complementary resources (Hunt et al. 2002). Complementary
resources act as the antecedent to idiosyncratic resources (Hunt et al. 2002), since in
order to create unique resources; both firms should combine their resources first.
When an outsourcee and an outsourcer come together, the goal is to achieve
superior performance outcomes (Teece 1988). Each firm is dependent on one another
and contributes to the relationship with its own resources. According to this model, each
party (outsourcee and outsourcer) has its own task-related resource endowments. Degree
of resource endowment fit to task is the degree of satisfying the interdependencies
between firms in order to accomplish the task in hand. When the two parties join forces,
without any modification, the mere existence of collection of these resource endowments
provide a certain degree of endowment fit to task which is called “potential
complementarities” in our conceptualization. Therefore, we propose:
P1: There is a positive relationship between task- related resources of the
outsourcer and potential complementarities
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P2: There is a positive relationship between task- related resources of the
outsourcee and potential complementarities

As stated above, when a firm is not self-sufficient or is not effectively/efficiently
deploying its resources, outsourcing is a remedy (Grant 1991). Competitive advantage
can be achieved in those cases by joining forces with another firm (Das and Teng 2000).
Hence, the value of the organization is increased by those complementary resources
(Milgrom and Roberts 1995). Therefore, potential complementarities have a positive
effect on the performance outcomes of the firms. Performance outcomes can be assessed
via three criteria: internally-oriented (i.e. little concern for competitors and customer,
hence inner directed), competitor-centered (i.e. relative to competitors) and customerfocused (i.e. customer benefits and satisfaction) performance (Cameron and Whetten
1983). Thus, we propose:
P3: There is a positive relationship between potential complementarities and:
a) internally-oriented performance,
b) competitor-centered performance, and
c) customer-focused performance

When two firms collaborate by an outsourcing relationship, their resources
complement one another to a certain degree (i.e. potential complementarities) and they
require a certain level of coordination in order to better handle the task interdependencies
(Stieglitz and Heine 2007). Characteristics of the task determine the intensity of the
interdependence and a highly interdependent task requires greater level of coordination
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and communication between the firms (Kumar et al. 2009). The potential
complementarities for the two firms are contingent upon the intensity of the
interdependencies that resides in the accomplishment of the task by these firms.
Following the typology of Kumar et al. (2009), the ten interdependencies are:
non-sticky form of pooled interdependence, sticky form of pooled interdependence, nonsticky form of sequential interdependence, sticky form sequential interdependence, nonsticky form of integration interdependence, partially sticky form integration
interdependence, fully sticky form integration interdependence, non-sticky form of
reciprocal interdependence, sticky form of reciprocal interdependence and intense
interdependence.
The costs of transferring the information about the task and status of the task are
called stickiness (Kumar et al.2009). Stickiness is relatively high for the tasks that are
uncertain, complex and difficult to express (Kumar et al. 2009). When tasks are
performed in a simultaneously parallel manner and remain independent of each other, it is
called pooled interdependence (Van de Ven et al. 1976). In the sticky form of pooled
interdependence, the actors should be informed about the status of the tasks of their
counterparts (Kumar et al. 2009). Integration interdependence requires a fitting activity
for the outcomes of the acts that are performed in a simultaneously parallel manner
(Kumar et al. 2009). When the task is not partitioned routinely or outcomes of the
activities are not standardized, sticky form of integration interdependence arises as the
costs of information transfer will be incurred (Kumar et al. 2009). In sequential
interdependence, activities are linked in a linear fashion whereas in reciprocal
interdependence one output becomes input to another and vice versa (Van de Ven et al.
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1976). In a same manner, sticky forms of sequential interdependence and reciprocal
interdependence arise due to the complex nature of the task. In the case of intense
interdependence, actors perform simultaneously and jointly therefore it is inherently
sticky (Kumar et al. 2009).
Standardization of activities, training and meeting on a common ground in terms
of language and communication will aid in easing the stickiness problem of
interdependence (Kumar et al. 2009). Especially technological advancements are useful
in communication and functioning of actors (Kumar et al. 2009). These factors and
remedies to interdependencies are analyzed under the concept of dynamic capabilities.
Dynamic capabilities are defined as „the firm‟s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure
internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments‟ (Teece et
al. 1997, p.516). Thus, dynamic capabilities are related to notions such as learning,
integration, reconfiguration and adaptation (Teece et al. 1997). These notions are at the
core of solving the interdependence problem as they act as coordination mechanisms.
For instance, in order training to act as a remedy to sticky interdependence, the actors in
the firm should have the learning ability which is a dynamic capability. In a same
manner, in order to solve integration interdependence, the actors in the firm should have
the integration ability which is again a dynamic capability. Thus, dynamic capabilities
act as a catalyst in solving interdependencies and aligning the tasks. Interdependencies
require effective coordination mechanisms (Malone and Crowston 1994) and close
alignment of tasks is the crucial factor in firm‟s performance (Bharadwaj et al. 2007).
Hence, we propose:
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P4: The relationship between potential complementarities and performance is
stronger when dynamic capabilities are high.

Since the dynamic capabilities concept takes the dynamic processes view instead
of a more static view observed in classical resource-based view (Newbert 2007),
relational factors become critical. Especially in understanding the motives behind firm‟s
willingness as well as ability to make use of or create dynamic capabilities, the relational
factors approach can be useful. According to the relational view, trust, cooperation,
keeping promises are some of the relational resources of exchange (Hunt et al. 2002).
Through the network of social relationships, social capital, which is a relational resource,
can be obtained (Baker 1990). Social capital is a multidimensional construct and is
comprised of structural, relational and cognitive dimensions (Nahapiet and Ghoshal
1998). Pattern of ties and connection between actors represent the structural component
(Burt 1992) whereas the issues of trust, norms and identification are explored under the
relational component (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). The cognitive component is related
to issues such as shared codes, shared language and shared narratives (Nahapiet and
Ghoshal 1998). Social capital is a key element in coordination of activities as it is argued
that resources stay unconnected and opportunities are unutilized in the absence of social
capital (Blyler and Coff 2003). Blyler and Coff (2003) contend that social capital is a
necessary condition for dynamic capabilities. Therefore, we propose:
P5: There is a positive relationship between social capital of the outsourcer and
dynamic capabilities
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P6: There is a positive relationship between social capital of the outsourcee and
dynamic capabilities

The above discussions and propositions lead to the conceptual model depicted in
Figure 1.

Empirical Model and Hypotheses
In the previous section, we discuss the conceptual model and respective
propositions. In this section, we provide an empirical model that allows for model
testing. Constructs are rearranged and simplified in order to make the model tractable
and testable. It is also important to have simple constructs that can be captured in a
questionnaire that will be administered to practicing managers. The empirical model is
depicted in Figure 2. The hypotheses to be tested according to this model are:

H1: Task- related resources of the outsourcer are positively related to potential
complementarities
H2: Task- related resources of the outsourcee are positively related to potential
complementarities
H3: Structural social capital of the outsourcer is positively related to learning
dynamic capabilities
H4: Structural social capital of the outsourcee is positively related to learning
dynamic capabilities
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H5: Potential complementarities are positively related to outsourcing partnership
performance
H6: Learning dynamic capabilities are positively related to outsourcing
partnership performance
H7: The relationship between potential complementarities and outsourcing
partnership performance is moderated by learning dynamic capabilities, whereby this is
stronger when learning dynamic capabilities are high
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CHAPTER 4 – RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
In the first section, the insights gained from the field interviews are discussed.
Next, the operationalization of the constructs is explained followed by the description of
the sampling plan, data collection procedures and method of analysis.

Field Interviews
Field interviews were conducted with the key informants who are practicing
managers of outsourcing in the consumer packaged goods (CPG) industry. The field
interviews with these two key informants continued throughout the study constituting a
fourteen month span. Their feedback guided the study throughout the whole research
from the selection of the context to the purification of the study scale items. The key
informants also played a significant role in convincing The Association of Sales and
Marketing Companies (ASMC) to endorse the study. Otherwise, it would not have been
possible to collect such a niche data by any other means.
First phase of the field interviews showed that the “headquarters selling task”1
was among the most outsourced functions in the consumer packaged goods industry.
Parvatiyar et al. (2006) also posited that the most critical factor for success is the
accomplishment of headquarters selling task and 57% of the time the headquarters selling
task is outsourced to third parties known as sales and marketing agencies (SMAs).
Hence, the headquarters selling task was chosen as the context of the study.

1

While the author realizes that, in the spirit of grammatical accuracy, an apostrophe is needed in the term
“headquarters selling task”, she chose to keep the term in the way it is used in the industry and general
literature.

45

After the second phase of the field interviews, it was realized that the collection of
the data from such a small population would be not only difficult but also unrealizable
without the sponsorship of the ASMC. The reason attributable to the facts that the
incentives would not work for the managers, most of the time these managers were on the
field and survey participation request emails were immediately considered as spam.
Besides, none of the market research firms contacted had any connections to create a
panel of respondents for this context.
The third phase of the field interviews revealed that even with the sponsorship of
the ASMC, the sample size would be inadequate to test higher order formative constructs
or complex relationships. Therefore, the need to specify which one of the dimensions of
the multi dimensional constructs and higher order formative construct played the most
important role in the headquarters selling task, emerged.
Later on, the ASMC agreed to sponsor the study. However, they requested
additional tasks (i.e. retail and administrative services) and items2 to be included in the
survey to be analyzed later and reported as a separate report.
The fourth phase of the field interviews revealed that the scale items in the initial
survey instrument needed to be simplified both in terms of length and wording.
Academic jargon was different from the practice and using the scale items as they were
would cause misunderstandings, boredom as well as incomplete responses. Therefore,
original scale items were simplified and shortened. Instead of using the outsourcer and
the outsourcee terms, informants recommended the usage of the field terms: CPG and
SMA. One of the most important factors in ensuring higher response rate is the effort
2

The additional items were adapted from Parvatiyar et al. (2006), Subramani (2004), Subramani and
Venkatraman (2003), Bensaou and Venkatraman (1995), Agarwal and Selen (2009) and Atuahene-Gima
and Murray (2007).
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needed to complete the questionnaire (Tedin and Hofstetter 1982). In the determination
of effort, survey design and length are the most defining factors (Deutskens et al.2004).
Hence, Yu and Cooper (1983) found out that 4 or 5 pages of questionnaire with 10 or 12
questions on each page resulted in higher response rates. Throughout 10 month span,
simplification and shortening of the survey continued with back and forth emails with the
key informants.
The next section explicates the operationalization of the constructs in the light of
the literature and the field interviews.

Operationalization of the Constructs
In the study, headquarters selling task was the sales and marketing task chosen for
the analysis. Headquarters selling task includes the activities that CPG needs to perform
in selling its product line to the headquarters of a retailer. Different from the retail
services task which includes in-store activities such as out of stock identification and
merchandising of promoted items, headquarters selling task is the heart of selling which
concerns the execution of the sales to retailers (Parvatiyar et al.2006). Headquarters
selling task includes functions such as “…development and maintenance of key contacts,
achieving retailer acceptance of new items, planning of joint marketing programs, and
influencing favorable product placement for company brands” (Parvatiyar et al. 2006,
p.7). The task is prevalently outsourced to SMAs (Parvatiyar et al. 2006). The first
phase of interviews also revealed that headquarters selling task is one of the most
important tasks in the performance of the CPG firms. Moreover, in the successful
accomplishment of this task, the CPG (outsourcer) and the SMA (outsourcee) are highly
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dependent on each other`s resources and capabilities. Therefore, headquarters selling
task was considered to be suitable for testing the resources, capabilities, interdependency
and performance concepts explored in the study.
The main constructs of this study are: a) task-related resources of the outsourcer,
b) task-related resources of the outsourcee, c) structural social capital of the outsourcer,
d) structural social capital of the outsourcee, e) potential complementarities, f) learning
dynamic capabilities, and g) outsourcing partnership performance.

Task-Related Resources
Resource-advantage theory categorizes resources as financial, physical, legal,
human, organizational, informational and relational (Hunt 2001). Task-related resources
(for both outsourcee and outsourcer) are the resources released from a relational aspect.
Therefore, we defined task-related resources as the non-relational resources needed to
accomplish a task such as financial, physical, legal, human and informational resources.
In the literature, two main approaches seem to be prevalent in measuring the
effects of resources on performance. First, the effect of a single resource on firm‟s
performance has been measured in several studies (e.g. Berman, Down and Hill 2002;
Deephouse 2000). The second stream of studies measured the effects of wide range of
resources simultaneously. Thus, Chandler and Hanks (1994) developed a 19 item 7
anchored scale to measure availability of resources and defined 19 type of resources.
Hence, the present study adapted Chandler and Hanks (1994) scale to the study context.
As the study had task-related resources of the outsourcer and task-related resources of the
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outsourcee constructs, two scales adapted from Chandler and Hanks (1994) were created
(Table 1).
In order to secure validity and reliability criteria, the scales needed to be pre
tested (Gerbing and Anderson 1988; Churchill 1979). Considering the fact that the initial
population was already small and very difficult to reach, the purification and pre tests of
the scale items were carried out with two key informants and three academicians. In the
context of outsourcing, key informants proposed 4 important task-related resources in the
accomplishment of headquarters selling task. Hence, managerial expertise, human,
financial and technological resources were concluded to be highly interrelated, thus
important resources in the accomplishment of the headquarters selling task. The terms
outsourcer and outsourcee were replaced with CPG and SMA respectively, as it was the
common terminology used in the practice. The final scale used in the study asked the
respondent to rate the degree his firm and the CPG utilizes the managerial expertise,
human, financial and technological resources on a 5 point scale, with very low and very
high anchors in each end (Table 2). Thus, both the task-related resources of the
outsourcer and the task-related resources of the outsourcee constructs were measured by a
reflective scale composed of 4 items.

Structural Social Capital
Social capital is a relational resource. It is a multidimensional construct with
three components: structural, relational and cognitive (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).
Structural component refers to pattern of ties and connections between actors (Burt
1992). Relational component considers issues such as trust, norms, obligation and
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identification (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). The cognitive component is associated with
shared codes, shared language and shared narratives (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). In the
literature, when the overall concept of social capital was operationalized, it was
operationalized as a first order reflective second order reflective construct (e.g., Koka and
Prescott 2002). However, majority of the studies considered the effect of single
dimension of the construct to a dependent variable (e.g., Atuahene-Gima and Murray
2007; Chiu, Hsu and Wang 2006). Hence, separate effect of each one of the structural,
relational and cognitive components was considered.
In the decision of which dimension of the social capital the study should
operationalize, insight gained from the field interviews as well as the theoretical
relationship between social capital and dynamic capabilities was considered. Since
dynamic capabilities were operationalized as the learning dynamic capabilities which
means using market intelligence to create further knowledge (Hurley and Hult 1998),
structural social capital as an antecedent to learning dynamic capabilities made more
theoretical sense. Moreover, field interviews pointed out that structural component was
more relevant to the characteristics of headquarters selling task. Headquarters selling
task requires formation of ties to develop key contacts and to learn from the experience
and acquire information to come up with strategies to influence customer acceptance
decisions and favorable product placement. Therefore, social capital was defined as the
structural social capital. Structural social capital was operationalized as the ties the
company forms in the industry to facilitate learning and information acquisition. Hence,
the scale developed by Atuahene-Gima and Murray (2007) was used as a reference. As
the study had structural social capital of the outsourcer and structural social capital of the
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outsourcee constructs, two scales adapted from Atuahene-Gima and Murray (2007) were
created (Table 3). The initial scale consisted of totally 5 items with one reverse coded
item, on a 5 point Likert scale. However, the initial scale was reduced to 2 item scale
after pre tested. The final instrument asked the respondent to comment on his agreement
about the statements for both his firm and the CPG. The statements were “My firm
maintains competitive intelligence” and “My firms learns a lot from its interactions with
its business partners” rated on a 5 point Likert scale (Table 4). Thus, both structural
social capital of the outsourcer and structural social capital of the outsourcee were
measured by 2 item reflective scales.

Potential Complementarities
The potential complementarities construct is defined as the degree of resource fit
to task without further arrangements. Since the interdependency between the tasks of
these parties affect the necessary cooperation and arrangements down the road, the
“resource fit to task” is a critical construct. According to Thompson (1967) there are
three kinds of interdependencies: pooled, sequential and reciprocal. In pooled
interdependence, each firm contributes by its own right, each contribution is necessary
and the common point is the final task (Thompson 1967). In sequential interdependence,
one task is an input to the other, therefore there is temporal order, whereas reciprocal
interdependence can be considered as a cyclic version of sequential interdependence
where one output becomes the input to the other and vice versa (Thompson 1967).
According to field interviews, two kind of arrangements were observed in the
headquarters selling task: Each party performs its own part (pooled dependence) or the task is
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performed jointly (reciprocal dependence). Hence, the resource endowments of the
outsourcee solely would not result in the successful accomplishment of the task. The
resources of the outsourcer and the outsourcee should be combined to perform the
headquarters selling task. Thus, it was concluded that the headquarters selling task had an
adequate level of interdependency that was suitable for testing of the hypothesized
relationships.
Potential complementarities construct was operationalized as the degree of success in
accomplishing the headquarters selling task with the already existing arrangement. Hence,
the scale was adapted from Van de Ven et al. (1976). First the respondents were asked to
define the existing arrangement that they have for the headquarters selling task to confirm
that headquarters selling has the adequate level of dependency (Table 5). Next, they were
asked to rate “how successfully the headquarters selling task is performed with the existing
arrangement” and “if they would like to change the existing arrangement” (reverse coded) on
a 5 point scale (Table 5). Hence, potential complementarities construct was measured with 2
reflective items.

Learning Dynamic Capabilities
Dynamic Capabilities is a complex construct that has been defined as a higher
order formative construct combined of several kind of capabilities such as learning,
integration, reconfiguration and adaptation capabilities (Teece et al. 1997).
A recent study by Pavlou and El Sawy (2011) operationalized the overall dynamic
capabilities construct as a second order formative, first order reflective construct with
sensing, learning, coordination and integration dynamic capabilities as subconstructs.
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However, there are fewer attempts to measure the dynamic capability as a higher order
formative construct. Instead, researchers preferred to examine the effect of single
dynamic capability dimension that was more relevant and specific to the context. It may
be attributable to the fact that operationalization of higher order formative constructs may
inherit multicollinearity problems. Moreover, the sample size should be high enough to
allow for testing higher order formative constructs. Another study on dynamic
capabilities defined several capabilities under the general concept of dynamic capabilities
(Agarwal and Selen 2009). Each dynamic capability was measured with reflective
measures and the effect of each capability on the dependent factor was analyzed. Hence,
following the same logic, we defined only one kind of dynamic capability that acted as
the most important factor in the relationship between the outsourcer and the outsourcee in
the accomplishment of the headquarters selling task.
The field interviews showed that partnership`s ability to learn from the
partnership experience and acquire the capabilities needed to further improve the
partnership is the most important factor in the outsourcing partnership performance.
Hence, we operationalized dynamic capabilities construct as the learning dynamic
capabilities. The collaborative organizational learning capability scale of Agarwal and
Selen (2009) was adapted to the concept of the study. The original adapted scale was a 3
item, Likert type scale. After the field interviews one item (“we have enhanced our
existing capabilities as a result of partnership”) was removed and the final scale consisted
of 2 items (Table 6). Thus, learning dynamic capabilities construct was measured with a
2 item reflective scale.
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Outsourcing Partnership Performance
In the light of field interviews, we observed that satisfaction from the outsourcing
partnership performance is a good proxy for the actual outsourcing partnership
performance. Satisfaction is the positive affective state resulting from the appraisal of
working relationship (Anderson and Narus 1984). The outsourcing partnership
performance scale was adapted from Brock-Smith and Barclay (1997). The original
study scale consisted of 5 items with one reverse coded item (Table 7). However, the
final scale was reduced to 3 items (Table 8). Hence, outsourcing partnership
performance was measured by a 3 item reflective scale.

Sampling Plan and Data Collection
Sampling Plan
Consumer packaged goods (CPG) industry was chosen to be the appropriate
setting for testing the hypothesized relationships. This selection was based on the fact
that there is a high pervasiveness of outsourcing of sales and marketing functions by
consumer packaged goods companies (Parvatiyar et al. 2006). Approximately one half of
the $500 billion CPG sales are represented by sales and marketing agencies (SMAs)
(Parvatiyar et al. 2006). Moreover, consumer packaged goods industry is one of the
largest valued industry.
Second phase of the field interviews revealed that the initial population that the
study could create a sample from was in fact small and difficult to reach. Only if the
Association of Sales and Marketing Companies (ASMC) supported the study, the
representative sample from SMAs could be obtained. The ASMC is a foundation that
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provides training, education and research to the consumer packaged goods industry. It
has over 20 active members who are practicing managers in sales and marketing
agencies. Another association that connects retailers, service firms and manufacturers in
the consumer packaged goods industry is the National Association of Retail Marketing
Services (NARMS). Through our contacts in the ASMC, SMAs who were members of
NARMS were also contacted.

Data Collection
The online survey instrument was programmed in Qualtrics3. Qualtrics is an
online survey programming tool that has several functions that allows for creating better
survey designs. The color of the rows changes as respondents click an answer for each
question, which allows better flow of the survey questions. Moreover, the forced
response option reminds the respondent to click an answer for the items that are forgotten
and does not allow passing to the other question without answering the prior first. This
option was very helpful in the current study in the control of missing data due to
carelessness of the respondents. Moreover, non-applicable column options were also
added for each question to prevent the respondents from answering the questions that
they did not have any opinion about.
Two versions of the online survey instrument exactly symmetric in every aspect
were created for SMA and CPG respondents (Appendix A and Appendix B). These
surveys contained the measures of the study constructs as well as the additional questions
requested by the ASMC to be included. Definition of the headquarters selling task was
3

Available at www.qualtrics.com
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provided and the respondent was asked to respond to questions thinking only one CPG in
mind. In addition, the survey for the SMAs included a part where the SMA could copy
and paste the email invitation to be sent to the CPG (Appendix A).
It has been shown that the emails whose delivery were accepted by the user are
more likely to be considered carefully and not be directed to spam emailbox (Tezinde,
Smith and Murphy 2002). Therefore, getting the approval of respondents before
directing them to the online survey link deemed to be necessary for higher response rate.
Hence, the invitation letters were sent by mail in batches to the 20 members of ASMC
and 60 members of NARMS through a one month span. Another crucial factor that
affects the response rate is the relevance and importance of the study as perceived by the
respondent (Tedin and Hofstetter 1982). In order to show the importance and credibility
of the study, third-party sponsorships were found to be useful (Dillman 2000). In
addition, sharing the results of the study also found to increase response rate
(Yammarino, Skinner and Childers 1991). Thus, the invitation letters included the letter
cover head with ASMC and GSU (Georgia State University) as the sponsors of the study,
the past reports of the ASMC related to outsourcing and the online survey link for the
study.
However, as some of the members of the ASMC are also members of NARMS,
the overall study population was 80 minus the duplicate members (SMAs who were
members of both ASMC and NARMS). NARMS membership list was not updated
recently so several invitations were returned in the mail. After accounting for
duplications and returned mail, the population size was reduced to 60. In order to
minimize the response bias due to key informant method, the SMAs were requested to
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the send the CPG version of the survey link to the CPG that they considered in assessing
the questions in the survey. Thus, a dyadic data was collected.
After the one month span, the reminder emails were sent to the SMAs and
additional responses were obtained. In total, the data yielded 20 usable responses (15
SMAs and 5 CPGs).

Method of Analysis
The chosen method of analysis was partial least squares path modeling approach.
PLS algorithm allows simultaneous testing of structural relationships (Chin 1998).
PLS is a powerful tool for testing the structural models as it has less restrictive
assumptions on measurement scales, data distribution and sample size (Chin 1998).
PLS can be both used for theory testing and development of theory (Chin 1998).
Compared to other covariance based techniques such as LISREL, it “ensures against
improper solutions and factor indeterminacy” (Fornell and Bookstein 1982, p.440).
One of the most important advantages of PLS is that it can be applied to small
sample size (Chin 1998). The rule of thumb for the minimum sample size that can be
analyzed in PLS is the highest of ten times (1) the number of indicators of the construct
with the largest number of formative indicators (2) the largest number of structural paths
directed at a particular construct (Chin 1998). A weak rule of thumb is 5 times the above
criteria (Chin 1998). Hence, the study sample size (N=20) just satisfied the criteria as
there were no blocks with formative indicators and the highest number of paths
influencing a dependent variable was 2.

57

The second advantage of PLS is that it does not assume any specific distribution
for the data. Therefore, the data does not need to satisfy any normality assumptions
(Chin 1998).
Third, bootstrapping procedure (Efron and Tibshirani 1993) in PLS creates large
number of data sets from taking samples from the original data set and gives t statistics
for the path coefficients and loadings.
Fourth, reliability and validity criteria for the construct measures can be tested in
a single run of PLS algorithm (Chin 1998). Hence, in order to test for structural
relationships between constructs, reliability and validity criteria of the constructs should
be met first (Chin 1998).
Fifth, moderator effects of constructs can be tested by the create moderating effect
function of PLS (Ringle, Wende and Will 2005) and comparing t statistics and effect size
of the main and moderator added model (Chin, Marcolin and Newsted 2003).
Sixth, PLS can be used to test common method bias by introducing a common
method factor to the model (Liang et al. 2007).
Therefore, PLS path modeling was utilized in the study to test the measurement
properties and hypothesized relationships.
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CHAPTER 5 – DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
This chapter explains the procedures employed for the data analysis. First, overall
profile of the respondents is given followed by the response bias test. Next, in the
measurement model section, reliability and validity checks for constructs and their
measures are provided followed by the detailed analysis of the common method bias.
Hypothesized relationships are then tested via structural model analysis followed by the
discussion of the results .

Respondents` Profile
Since the SMA respondents were requested to send a CPG version of the survey
link to their contacts at the manufacturing company (CPG), our data consisted of both
SMA and CPG respondents and yielded 20 usable responses from both sides. The
response rate is determined by dividing the number of completed questionnaires by the
number of total sample who received the questionnaires (Kviz 1977). Of the 60 SMAs,
15 responded to the online survey yielding a response rate of 25%. While it is not known
how many of the SMA respondents did actually send the survey link to the CPG,
assuming all 15 did forward the request, the effective response rate for CPGs was 33%.
Although, the response rates seem to be small, several researchers found that surveys
with lower response rates can in fact yield as accurate results as those with higher rates
(Holbrook, Krosnick and Pfent 2007; Keeter et al.2006). Thus, the representativeness of
the sample is the most important quality criteria that should be satisfied.
In the two survey instruments (versions for CPGs and SMAs), each respondent
was asked to comment on his/her own company profile, such as number of employees
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and annual sales revenue (Subramani 2004) (Appendix A and Appendix B). It appeared
that many of the large national SMAs responded, as the SMA sample represented over
50% of total SMA sales revenues (Table 9). The company size statistics also conveyed
that the majority of the SMA respondents was from either medium or large sized SMAs
with 41.7% and 50%, respectively (Table 10). CPG firm level data was in line with SMA
characteristics and the respondents were from medium (40%) and large (40%) sized CPG
firms (Table 11). Moreover, CPGs had considerable level of annual sales volume with
40% between 1 and 5 and the other 40% above 5 billion U.S. dollars (Table 12).
Another important factor considered was the total number of years CPGs and
SMAs were working together (Subramani 2004). The results revealed that only 10.5 %
of the respondents had less than 4 years of partnership relationship (Table 13). About
36.8% of the respondents had between 4 and 5 years, whereas more than 50% of the
respondents had more than 5 years of experience (Table 13). These values suggested that
the respondents had adequate experience to assess the working relationship between
CPGs and SMAs.
The final statistics was the degree of dependency between CPGs and SMAs in the
accomplishment of the headquarters selling task. As Table 14 shows, only 15% of the
respondents stated that there is no dependency between CPGs and SMAs. Eighty-five
percent of the respondents stated that headquarters selling task requires contribution of
each party, thus is a highly dependent task (Table 14).
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Response Bias
Since the invitations to the online survey link were mailed in batches, the
responses were observed through a one month span. After this period, total number of
respondents was 11 (8SMAs and 3CPGs) constituting the 55% of the final sample.
Nine more responses were gathered once the reminder emails were sent (7SMAs
and 2CPGs). In order to test whether early and late responses differed significantly or
not, nonparametric test function of the SPSS 13.0 module for 2 independent samples was
utilized. The early and late responses were divided as group1 and group 2. MannWhitney U tests revealed that there were no differences between early and late responses
across all the study variables.

Measurement Model
The main model was run by PLS algorithm module in SmartPLS 2.0 software
(Ringle et al. 2005). The overview of the quality results of the main model is depicted in
Table 15. In order to assess the internal consistency and reliability of the constructs, both
Cronbach`s Alpha and Composite Reliability values were checked. Nunnally (1978)
advised a Cronbach`s Alpha value between 0.6 and 0.7 for 2-3 item scales. Hence, for all
the constructs, Cronbach`s Alpha values were almost equal or higher than the value of
0.7. Composite reliability, another inter item consistency measure, is advised to be
higher than 0.7 (Fornell and Larcker 1981; Nunnally and Berstein 1994). All the
constructs, but the “structural social capital of the outsourcee” construct (CR=0.56)
satisfied the criteria.
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Next, constructs were checked for convergent validity. The AVE value (Table
15) provides information about the amount of variance of the indicators explained by the
construct and should be above 0.5 (Fornell and Larcker 1981). The AVE value for each
construct was well above the 0.5 criteria, but the AVE value of the “structural social
capital of the outsourcee” construct was 0.445. The second criteria for convergent
validity requires the loading of the items on their respective constructs to be higher than
0.7 (Hulland 1999). As it is depicted in Table 16, loadings of all the items to their
respective constructs were higher than 0.7, except the item measuring the “competitive
intelligence of the outsourcee”. The loading of that item to the structural social capital of
the outsourcee construct was only 0.284, indicating poor convergent validity.
In the assessment of discriminant validity of the constructs, a construct correlation
matrix that contained the squared root AVEs along the diagonals was formed (Table 17).
In order to satisfy the discriminant validity criteria, all the correlations should be lower
than the squared root AVEs (Fornell and Larcker 1981). All the constructs passed this
criterion. The second criteria for discriminant validity requires the loading of each item
to be greater in its construct and lower in other constructs (Chin 1998; Gefen, Straub and
Boudreau 2000). As it is depicted in Table 18, only the item measuring the competitive
intelligence of the outsourcee did not satisfy the criteria. It loaded greater on the taskrelated resources of the outsourcee construct.
In order to test the significance of the loadings, re-sampling techniques needed to
be employed (Bagozzi, Yi and Singh 1991). Thus, we ran a bootstrap procedure in
SmartPLS to test if the loadings of the items on their respective constructs were
significant (Efron and Tibshirani 1993; Chin 1998). The item loadings output provided
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the t-values for the loadings (Table 19). The item measuring the competitive intelligence
of the outsourcee had a t value of 0.95 which was not significant (p>0.1), indicating poor
convergent validity.
The above results pointed out that the item measuring the competitive intelligence
of the outsourcee was indeed problematic. However, the elimination of items should be
considered with caution. If the deletion of the item results in a significant increase in
both AVE and the composite reliability of the construct (Henseler, Ringle and Sinkowics
2009), and the item loads insignificantly (<0.4) on its construct, it is advisable to delete
the item from the model (Nunnally 1978). Therefore, the item measuring the competitive
intelligence of the outsourcee was deleted from the main model.
The model was run for the second time by PLS. The overview of the quality
criteria values are depicted in Table 20. For all the constructs, Cronbach`s Alpha values
were almost equal or higher than the threshold value of 0.7 (Nunnally 1978). Composite
Reliability values for each construct were very high (Fornell and Larcker 1981; Nunnally
and Bernstein 1994).
AVE values (Table 20) for each construct were well above the 0.5 criteria
(Fornell and Larcker 1981). Moreover, the loading of the items on their respective
constructs (item loadings) were higher than 0.7 (Table 21), indicating high convergent
validity (Hulland 1999).
The construct correlation matrix that contained the squared root AVEs along the
diagonals depicted in Table 22 showed that all the correlations were lower than the
squared root AVEs, satisfying discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981).
Moreover, cross loadings (Table 23) showed that the loading of each item was greater in
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its own construct and lower in other constructs, another satisfactory finding for
discriminant validity (Chin 1998; Gefen et al. 2000).
Finally, a bootstrap procedure in PLS was employed to test if the loadings of the
items on their respective constructs were significant (Chin 1998). All the t-values for the
loadings (Table 24) were significant (t> 1.65, p<0.1). Hence, the measurement model
satisfied both reliability and validity criteria.

Common Method Bias
Common method bias can be problematic when the dependent and independent
variables are collected from the same source in a single research setting (Podsakoff et al.
2003). Bagozzi and Yi (1991, p.426) defined common method variance as “the variance
that is attributable to the measurement method rather than to the construct of interest”.
Hence, the existence of common method bias threatens the validity of conclusions about
the hypothesized relationships (Campbell and Fiske 1959).
Since, the study employed key informant method and survey technique, common
method bias was the biggest concern. Therefore, procedural remedies proposed by
Podsakoff et al. (2003) were followed whenever applicable in the research design to
control for the common method bias. First, two versions of the survey instrument were
created. Each version of the survey was designed symmetrically to allow for
combination of the observations from both sides (SMAs and CPGs). Hence, it was
expected that the amount of bias will be minimal due the fact that dyadic data were
collected from both SMAs and CPGs. Second, the final survey instrument included
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several other measurement items that impeded the respondents from guessing the
hypothesized relationships. Third, some of the scale items were reverse coded.
In order to test whether the procedural precautions were effective and that
common method bias was not a concern for the study, two common method bias analyses
were conducted.
First, Harman`s single-factor test was employed (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). All
the variables of the study were entered to the factor analysis in SPSS 13.0 module. The
un-rotated factor solution showed that there are multiple factors that accounted the
variance in variables. Hence, one factor explained at most 26.8% of the variance.
Therefore, common method variance appeared to be not significantly biasing the study
results.
Second, the PLS- based common method variance analysis was applied to
confirm the results of Harman`s single-factor test. Following the guidelines of Podsakoff
et al. (2003), Liang et al. (2007) explained the introduction of the common method factor
to the structural model in PLS step by step. This study followed Liang et al. (2007)‟s
approach. First, each indicator in the study was transformed to a first order reflective
construct with a single indicator. Thus, the first order reflective constructs in the model
became second order reflective constructs. Then, a common method factor was
introduced, the indicators of which were all the indicators in the model. Finally, paths
from the common method factor to all the single indicator constructs were defined.
The model was run in SmartPLS 2.0 software (Ringle et al. 2005). As indicated
in Table 25, none of the loadings of the indicators to the common method factor was
significant. Hence, the first criterion for the non existence of common method bias was
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met (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). Mimicking the Liang et al. (2007) procedure, a table
showing the average variances of the indicators and method factor were constructed
(Table 26). The average variance explained by the indicators was 76.7%, where the
average variance explained by the common factor was only 4.9%, yielding an
inconsiderable ratio of 16:1. Therefore, it can be concluded that common method bias
was not a concern for the study.

Structural Model
The second step in the model analysis was testing the hypotheses for the main
relationships. The hypotheses‟ testing was conducted in two steps as there was an
interaction (moderator) effect. First, the basic model was run in PLS excluding the
interaction effect to test the main hypotheses. Second, interaction effect of learning
dynamic capabilities and potential complementarities construct was added to the main
model to test the moderating effect of learning dynamic capabilities.
The PLS run resulted in R square values of 0.214, 0.181 and 0.433 for potential
complementarities, learning dynamic capabilities and outsourcing partnership
performance, respectively. The value of 0.433 suggested that the variance of the
outsourcing partnership performance explained by the model is indeed high, above the
moderate level of 0.33 (Chin 1998, p.323). The variance in learning dynamic capabilities
as explained by structural social capital of the outsourcee and structural social capital of
the outsourcer was weak, as it was below 0.19 (Chin 1998, p.323). However, the
variance in potential complementarities as explained by the task-related resources of the
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outsourcee and the task-related resources of the outsourcer was between moderate and
weak (Chin 1998).
The path coefficients and t statistics of the main model are shown in Table 27.
The path coefficient between potential complementarities and outsourcing partnership
performance constructs posited that potential complementarities had a positive influence
on outsourcing partnership performance, but the influence was insignificant (β= 0.290, t=
0.94, p>0.1). Therefore, hypothesis 5 was not supported.
The path coefficient between learning dynamic capabilities and outsourcing
partnership performance constructs showed that learning dynamic capabilities had a
strong positive and significant influence on outsourcing partnership performance (β=
0.514, t= 3.11, p<0.01). Thus, hypothesis 6 was supported.
The path coefficient between the task-related resources of the outsourcer and
potential complementarities constructs showed that the task-related resources of the
outsourcer had a positive and significant influence on potential complementarities (β=
0.452, t= 1.649, p<0.1). This provides support for hypothesis 1.
The path coefficient between the task-related resources of the outsourcee and
potential complementarities posited that the task-related resources of the outsourcee had a
positive influence on potential complementarities but the influence was insignificant (β=
0.186, t= 0.66, p>0.1). Therefore, no evidence was found to support hypothesis 2.
The path coefficient between structural social capital of the outsourcer and
learning dynamic capabilities posited that structural social capital of the outsourcer had a
significant influence on learning dynamic capabilities but the influence was negative (β=
-0.467, t= 1.679, p<0.1). Hence, hypothesis 3 was not confirmed.
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Finally, the path coefficient between structural social capital of the outsourcee and
learning dynamic capabilities posited that structural social capital of the outsourcee had a
positive but insignificant influence on learning dynamic capabilities (β= 0.164, t= 0.488,
p>0.1). Hence, there was not enough support for hypothesis 4.
In order to the test the moderating effect of learning dynamic capabilities in the
relationship between potential complementarities and outsourcing partnership
performance, an interaction term composed of learning dynamic capabilities and
potential complementarities was introduced to the PLS model (Chin et al. 2003). The
results showed that the effect of the interaction term on outsourcing partnership
performance was insignificant (β= 0.181, t= 0.495, p>0.1). Moreover, the R square
values for the main constructs before and after the introduction of the interaction term
were almost equal (Table 28). The effect size was calculated by the formula advised by
Cohen (1988). The Rsquare value of the construct in the main model was subtracted
from the Rsquare value of the construct in the interaction added model. Then, that value
was divided by 1 minus the Rsquare value of the construct in the main model. For all of
the main constructs, the effect size was almost equal to zero pointing out almost
unrecognizable effect of the interaction term on the model (Cohen 1988). Hence,
hypothesis 7 was not supported.

Findings
Although the sample size was quite small, it represented most of the large and
medium sized SMAs as well as CPGs. Moreover, the majority of the respondents had
over 5 years of ongoing partnering relationship with the CPGs (or SMAs) and, thus, had
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adequate outsourcing relationship experience with the partner to assess the items in the
survey. The final sample size was quite small but considering the fact the initial
population frame was also small, representativeness of the sample can be deemed quite
satisfactory.
Procedural controls in research design were taken to minimize the common
method bias. In addition, post hoc analysis signified that common method was not
accountable for most of the variance explained.
Though the reliability of the scales was satisfactory, an item was removed from
the structural path analysis due to the fact that the discriminant and convergent validity
criteria were violated. Although the constructs are advised to be measured by multiple
items, many of the studies found that in fact single item scales can be as effective as the
multiple item ones (e.g., Bergkvist and Rossiter 2007).
Two of the main hypothesized relationships were supported out of a total of seven
hypotheses. Considering the small number of sample size, these results are quite
promising. More importantly, the most important construct of the study “learning
dynamic capabilities” was found to have a strong and positive effect on outsourcing
partnership performance.
Since both the moderating effect of learning dynamic capabilities and the
relationship between potential complementarities and outsourcing partnership
performance emerged as insignificant, one can conclude that learning dynamic
capabilities is the most defining factor in the success of outsourcing relationships.
The task-related resources of the outsourcee were found to have a non significant
positive effect on potential complementarities. On the contrary, the task related resources
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of the outsourcer had a significant positive effect on the construct, pointing out the
outsourcee is bounded by the resources outsourcer provides on the accomplishment of the
headquarters selling task. Hence, outsourcing of the headquarters selling task is far from
the common outsourcing belief of one-sided transaction. Instead, the parties need to
work as partners.
Although the structural social capital of the outsourcee had a positive insignificant
effect on learning dynamic capabilities, structural social capital of the outsourcer had a
significant negative influence on the learning dynamic capabilities. This finding
contrasts with our theoretical model. The resource-advantage theory posits that social
capital has a positive effect on dynamic capabilities. Moreover, our findings showed that
resources of the outsourcer are important in the outsourcing performance and outsourcing
relationship resembles partnerships. One possible explanation for the above mentioned
negative influence is that if some aspects of the outsourcing relationship fails, the
outsourcer may attribute the responsibility solely to the outsourcee instead of the
partnership. Thus, as the outsourcer gains more competitive intelligence and information
from the outsourcing partnership, instead of using it for the benefit of the partnership, he
might use it to increase his demands and impede the overall learning curve of the
outsourcing partnership. This finding opens a venue for future research. For instance,
literature on power (e.g., Dwyer and Walker 1981; Wilkinson and Kipnis 1978) can be
used to explain this finding. When there is power imbalance between parties, the
powerful party may act manipulative and be demanding on the other side (Bannister
1969). Hence, as the outsourcer gains competitive intelligence and learns from his
relationships, he realizes the potential of other opportunities. Such revelations might lead
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him to believe that he deserves better and lead to increase his demands on the outsourcee.
Hence, instead of sharing these opportunities with the outsourcee to enhance the
partnership performance, he might choose to pursue the self-serving option thus creating
a negative impact on the learning dynamic capabilities that is observed in this study.
Naturally, such a behavior goes against the very core of an outsourcing relationship
which is based on the intention that both parties jointly learn and grow thus enabling the
learning dynamic capabilities of the partnership to take effect.
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CHAPTER 6 – DISCUSSION
The study proposes a complex conceptual model that can be employed not only in
studying outsourcing relationships but also in any business relationship where two parties
join their forces, such as joint ventures, strategic alliances, franchising, and so forth. The
study also differentiates between the resources needed to accomplish a function as social
capital and task-related (non-relational) resources. This allows for the distinct
identification of how each type of resource contributes to the final performance
outcomes.
Another important theoretical contribution of the study is to explicate the routes
where task-related resources and social capital affect the outsourcing partnership
performance. The results show that task-related resources influence the degree of
endowment fit to task (potential complementarities) while the social capital affects the
dynamic capabilities which are needed to transform the resources into higher
performance outcomes.
In the conceptual model constructs are proposed as higher order constructs where
extensive classification of each contributing factor is shown. However, in the specified
context the most important factors contributing to the outsourcing of headquarters selling
task was considered. Hence, in different contexts, different operationalization of the
constructs can be used in the light of the proposed theoretical model. For instance, if the
task chosen requires high agility, then the operationalization of the dynamic capability as
an adaptation dynamic capability would be more appropriate. In contrast, if the chosen
task is market intelligence then the operationalizaton of the dynamic capability as a
sensing dynamic capability would make more sense.
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The study opens a venue for alternative ways of operationalization of the
constructs such as potential complementarities where the degree of fit of resources to the
task without extra arrangements has been measured by two reflective measures with a
logical flow of three questions in the final survey. The respondents were first asked to
determine the dependency type that exists in the accomplishment of headquarters selling
task. This helped to confirm that dependency actually existed between the outsourcer and
the outsourcee in the accomplishment of the headquarters selling task. Then, with two
more questions the degree of success in resolving the dependencies was assessed.
The field interviews and the literature showed that for the headquarters selling
task, learning dynamic capabilities are the most important factor and structural social
capital is the antecedent to learning dynamic capabilities. Moreover, managerial
expertise, technological, human and financial resources are the interrelated factors
affecting the partnership complementarities. Hence, for different contexts or different
tasks of outsourcing, different resources, other dimensions of social capital (i.e. relational
and cognitive) and other dynamic capabilities (e.g. integration or adaptation capability)
may need to be considered. This implies that the overarching theoretical model proposed
here can be used as a roadmap for other conceptualizations.
Departing from the traditional sense that outsourcing is a task where the success
or failure is predominantly dependent on the outsourcee, this study shows that the
resources as well as the social capital of the outsourcer are critical factors for successful
outsourcing. Once again it is clear that in today`s world, nothing can be left unconnected
and every success is a product of a chain of connections and resources.
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Another important contribution of the study is to demonstrate how PLS can be
aided to measure complex structural relationships with a small sample size. Moreover,
the moderator as well as the common method analyses are explicated in detail. Satisfying
the minimum sample size requirement of the PLS was quite challenging. Even in PLS,
there is a limit to number of relationships one can test. Hence, the control variables could
not be included in the model, as the main model itself was already complicated and the
sample size was at the minimum threshold for testing the main model.
The managerial implications of this study are substantial since the research itself
was inspired from and rooted in practice. Interestingly, the dynamic capabilities concept
which raised concern and was not originally appreciated by the practitioners, in fact,
turned out to be the most important defining factor for explaining successful outsourcing
performance. In fact, even more important than the combination of task-related resources
of the parties, learning dynamic capabilities of the partnership emerged as having a
significant positive effect on the outsourcing partnership performance. In addition, the
findings indicated that headquarters selling task required a hybrid model where both the
outsourcer and the outsourcee should cooperate with both task-related resources and
social capital. Thus, the traditional view that the failure of the outsourcing partnership
performance is solely due to the outsourcee has been nullified by this study. Our findings
indicate that task-related resources of the outsourcer and social capital of the outsourcer
are even more important than those of the outsourcee`s.
In general, management can make use of these findings by considering the fact
that outsourcing relationships are, in fact, partnerships. The importance of dynamic
capabilities has been quantified by this study. Hence, learning dynamic capabilities, (i.e.
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parties` ability to learn from the experience), connections and operational capabilities,
were found to be the most defining factors in the accomplishment of headquarters selling
task. Clearly, companies can improve performance outcomes by focusing on the specific
dynamic capabilities related to the task in hand.
The study was limited by data availability given that the outsourcing context is
perhaps one of the most difficult contexts to obtain data. While panel data can be
accessed for most of field studies, for the outsourcing context this is almost impossible.
Hence, access to data can only be possible with personal contacts and the sponsorship of
the associations. Even with the endorsement, managers are hard to convince and none of
the traditional techniques (e.g. incentives, third party endorsements, importance of the
findings, etc.) actually works to increase their cooperation. Thus, the sample size of this
study is small compared to other studies in the literature. However, considering the
company size and annual sales volume statistics of the study, the representativeness of
the sample for the defined context is quite satisfactory.
Due to the fact that initial population and the corresponding sample size were
small, the study did not allow for the operationalization of the higher order constructs as
well as the control variables to be included to the model. However, as the study defined a
specific context for the outsourcing relationships (i.e. headquarters selling), determination
of the most important underlying factors can be more valuable in terms of providing on
the spot recommendations.
Moreover, since the study had to balance the needs of the research with the needs
of the sponsoring organization, the survey contained additional items in lieu of multiitem scales typically used in academic research. However, the study overcame this
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limitation by choosing the items of already existing scales with high reliabilities in the
literature. Moreover, PLS, which works well with both single and multi item scales, was
used in the analysis (Henseler et al. 2009). Hence, the operationalization of the
constructs was concrete in the sense that even single item scales would work as
effectively (Bergkvist and Rossiter 2007).
Although, the data access was the biggest limitation of the study and the overall
study sample size was small, in terms of being the first application of a novel concept,
representativeness of the sample and bringing out the importance of dynamic capabilities,
value gained through the study outweighed the data limitations.
A number of future research implications can be gleaned from the findings. For
example, studies may use the model and constructs of the study to examine different
outsourcing tasks (such as in-store merchandising and shelf management). Different
contexts, hence different tasks, would have distinct underlying relationships to be
explored. The richness of the study constructs allows for transporting the theoretical
framework to different dimensions, antecedents and, thus, different structural models.
For instance, in the accomplishment of administrative services task, the resources and the
social capital of the outsourcee may become more important than those of the
outsourcer`s. As the administrative task requires less agility, the effect of potential
complementarities construct on the performance outcomes may be found to be more
important than the effect of dynamic capabilities.
Different moderating relationships, such as the environmental volatility and
dynamic capability interaction, can be examined within the conceptual framework
offered here. Certain dimensions of the dynamic capability construct (such as adaptation)
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are inherently related to change and environmental volatility. Thus, the effect of dynamic
capability on the performance outcomes may become even more important in the highly
uncertain environments.
The current model can be applied to other settings such as alliances to test the
possible outcomes of potential complementarities and dynamic capabilities. According
to the nature of the alliance, task-related resources construct of each party can be
measured by different types of resources and the type of dynamic capabilities that emerge
as influential can change accordingly (for example, integration or adaptation capabilities
may become more important than others).
Interestingly, the structural social capital of the outsourcer emerged as a
significant negative influence on the learning dynamic capabilities, although theoretically
it should have a positive influence. It is plausible that as the outsourcer gains more
competitive intelligence and information, he becomes increasingly more demanding and
impedes the overall learning curve of the outsourcing partnership. Although, our study
showed that, in terms of resources and social capital, both parties have influence on the
partnership; the outsourcer may not always behave in the desired direction particularly if
he has the bigger power in the relationship. Hence, future research can examine the
effect of power and determine the specific conditions under which the powerful
outsourcer is likely to become manipulative and demanding in the relationship.
The study was conducted with a U.S. sample, however, in the international
context, even for the same task, the impactful resources and dynamic capabilities are
likely to differ from country to country. For instance, for the developing countries,
technological and financial resources may determine the performance outcomes more
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distinctly. Hence, the application of the model to different cultural and national contexts
might yield some interesting insights and new research avenues.
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TABLES
TABLE 1: INITIAL SCALE FOR TASK-RELATED RESOURCES
Task-Related Resources of the Outsourcee
The following items are representative of the task-related resources needed to accomplish
the headquarters selling task. Please rate if your firm is in an advantageous position in
those resources. {7 point scale- great disadvantage(1), significant disadvantage (2), slight
disadvantage (3), neither advantage or disadvantage (4), slight advantage (5), significant
advantage (6), great advantage (7), N/A}
My firm's position on:
1. Availability of financial capital . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Headquarters selling expertise . . . . . . .
3. Highly productive employees . . . .
4. Expertise in customer service . .
5. Access to low cost labor . . . . . . . . .
6. Managerial expertise . . . . . .
7. Employees trained to provide superior customer service
8. Employees with innovative, new ideas
9. Technological resources enabling better information dissemination

Task-Related Resources of the Outsourcer

The following items are representative of the task-related resources needed to accomplish
the headquarters selling task. Please rate if your outsourcer is in an advantageous position
in those resources. {great disadvantage(1), significant disadvantage (2), slight
disadvantage (3), neither advantage or disadvantage (4), slight advantage (5), significant
advantage (6), great advantage (7), N/A}
My outsourcer's position on:
1. Availability of financial capital . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Headquarters selling expertise . . . . . . .
3. Highly productive employees . . . .
4. Expertise in customer service . .
5. Access to low cost labor . . . . . . . . ..
6. Managerial expertise . . . . . .
7. Employees trained to provide superior customer service
8. Employees with innovative, new ideas
9. Technological resources enabling better information dissemination
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TABLE 2: FINAL SCALE FOR TASK-RELATED RESOURCES
Please rate the degree your firm and your typical CPG utilize the following resources to
perform the headquarters selling task.

YOUR FIRM
Very
LOW

Low

Average

High

CPG
Very
HIGH

1-Technological Res.

2-Human Resources

3-Managerial Expertise

4-Financial Resources
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N/A

Very
LOW

Low

Average

High

Very
HIGH

N/A

TABLE 3: INITIAL SCALE FOR STRUCTURAL SOCIAL CAPITAL
Structural Social Capital of the Outsourcee (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 5 = “strongly
agree”,N/A)
1. Your firm maintains close contact with other firms in the industry.
2. Your firm learns a lot from its interactions with firms in the industry.
3. Your firm has social interaction with other firms with knowledge about conditions
in the industry.
4. Your firm puts a lot of effort in building relationships with other knowledgeable
firms in the industry.
5. Your firm doesn‟t have social interaction with other firms with knowledge about
conditions in the industry.(R)
Structural Social Capital of the Outsourcer (1 = “strongly disagree,” and 5= “strongly
agree”,N/A)
1. Your outsourcer maintains close contact with other firms in the industry.
2. Your outsourcer learns a lot from its interactions with firms in the industry.
3. Your outsourcer has social interaction with firms with knowledge about
conditions in the industry.
4. Your outsourcer puts a lot of effort in building relationships with other
knowledgeable firms in the industry.
5. Your outsourcer doesn‟t have social interaction with other firms with knowledge
about conditions in the industry.(R)
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TABLE 4: FINAL SCALE FOR STRUCTURAL SOCIAL CAPITAL
Please state your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following
statements about your FIRM and your typical CPG (the same manufacturer you
evaluated and named in the previous section).

Non-Applicable

Strongly
AGREE

Agree

Neither Agree Nor
Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
DISAGREE

Non-Applicable

CPG

Agree
Strongly
AGREE

Neither Agree Nor
Disagree

Strongly
DISAGREE
Disagree

Your FIRM

1-Maintains competitive
intelligence.

























2-Learns a lot from its
interactions with its business
partners (SMAs, CPGs and retail
firms).
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TABLE 5: FINAL SCALE FOR POTENTIAL COMPLEMENTARITIES
Please select which best describes your typical arrangement with the CPG for the
headquarters selling task.

We perform all the
activities

We performs some activities
and the CPG performs
other activities



We jointly perform with
the CPG all activities
Other







Now, please rate how successfully the headquarters selling task is performed with this
CPG by using the above arrangement you selected

Very
Unsuccessfully

Unsuccessfully



Neither
Successfully nor
Unsuccessfully



Very
Successfully

Successfully





NonApplicable





Would you like to change the above arrangement you currently have for the headquarters
selling task?

Never


Maybe


Unsure

Probably
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Definitely


Non-Applicable


TABLE 6: FINAL SCALE FOR LEARNING DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES
Please state your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following
statements about your OUTSOURCING PARTNERSHIP with this typical CPG.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Agre
e

Strongly
Agree

NonAppli
cable

1- Both firms have learned or
acquired information from the
partnership including weaknesses,
strengths, gaps, and discontinuities.













2- Both firms have learned or
acquired new critical capabilities or
skills from the partnership.
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TABLE 7: INITIAL SCALE FOR OUTSOURCING PARTNERSHIP
PERFORMANCE
Please rate your outsourcing partnership performance (1 = strongly disagree, and 7 =
strongly agree, N/A).
1.
2.
3.
4.

Some aspects of our working relationship could be better.
Overall, we are both quite satisfied with our working relationship.
I am happy with my working relationship with this outsourcer.
Compared to other working relationships I've known
or heard about, the one I have with this outsourcer is quite good.
5. Overall, we are both quite dissatisfied with our working relationship.
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TABLE 8: FINAL SCALE FOR OUTSOURCING PARTNERSHIP
PERFORMANCE
Please state your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following
statements about the working relationship of your OUTSOURCING PARTNERSHIP
with the typical CPG (the manufacturer you evaluated in previous sections).

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

NonApplicable













2- Overall, we are satisfied.













3- Better than with other CPGs.













1- Could not be better.
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TABLE 9: SMA ANNUAL SALES REVENUE
U.S. Dollars
(in millions)
< 50

Frequency

%

3

33.33

50-250

4

44.44

>1000

2

22.22

9
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TABLE 10: SMA COMPANY SIZE

Number of Employees
< 150

Frequency
1

%
8.3

150- 300

5

41.7

>300

6

50.0

12
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TABLE 11: CPG COMPANY SIZE
Number of Employees
< 500

Frequency
1

%
20

500-1000

2

40

>1000

2

40

5
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TABLE 12: CPG ANNUAL SALES REVENUE

U.S. Dollars
(in billions)
<1

Frequency

%

1

20

1-5

2

40

>5

2

40

5

90

TABLE 13: YEARS OF WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SMA AND
CPG

Years
<4

Frequency
2

%
10.53

4-5

7

36.84

6-10

5

26.32

>10

5

26.32

19
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TABLE 14: DEPENDENCY CHARACTERISTICS OF HQ SELLING

Frequency
We perform all the activities

Percent

3

15.0

9

45.0

5

25.0

We perform some activities and the CPG performs others

We jointly perform all activities with the CPG
Other

3

15.0

Total

20

100.0
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TABLE 15: FIRST MEASUREMENT MODEL- OVERVIEW

AVE

Composite
Reliability

R
Square

Cronbach`s
Alpha

POTENTIAL COMPLEMENTARITIES

0.76619

0.86714

0.21447

0.70774

LEARNING DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES

0.76209

0.86485

0.19868

0.69122

TASK-RELATED RESOURCES OF THE
OUTSOURCER (CPG)

0.68329

0.89496

0.84445

TASK-RELATED RESOURCES OF THE
OUTSOURCEE (SMA)

0.79953

0.94058

0.93869

OUTSOURCING PARTNERSHIP
PERFORMANCE

0.70487

0.87744

STRUCTURAL SOCIAL CAPITAL OF THE
OUTSOURCER (CPG)

0.85357

0.92098

0.82982

STRUCTURAL SOCIAL CAPITAL OF THE
OUTSOURCEE (SMA)

0.44549

0.55845

0.80493
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0.43456

0.79240

TABLE 16: FIRST MEASUREMENT MODEL- ITEM LOADINGS

POTENTIAL
COMPLEMENTA
RITIES

PC1

0.8173

PC2

0.9297

LEARNING
DYNAMIC
CAPABILITIES

DC1

0.9022

DC2

0.8427

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCERS OF
THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

R1_CPG

0.7568

R2_CPG

0.9024

R3_CPG

0.9224

R4_CPG

0.7037

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCES OF
THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

R1_SMA

0.9756

R2_SMA

0.7628

R3_SMA

0.9186

R4_SMA

0.9059

OUTSOURCING
PARTNERSHIP
PERFORMANCE

OPP1

0.8166

OPP2

0.8723

OPP3

0.8288

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL CAPITAL
OF THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

SC1_CPG

0.9095

SC2_CPG
SC1_SM
A
SC2_SM
A

0.9381

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL
CAPITAL OF
THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

0.2842
0.9001
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TABLE 17: FIRST MEASUREMENT MODEL- CONSTRUCT CORRELATIONS
AND SQUARE ROOT AVES

POTENTIAL
COMPLEMENT
ARITIES

LEARNING
DYNAMIC
CAPABILITIES

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCERS OF
THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCES OF
THE OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

OUTSOURCING
PARTNERSHIP
PERFORMANCE

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL CAPITAL
OF THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

POTENTIAL
COMPLEMENTAR
ITIES

0.875

LEARNING
DYNAMIC
CAPABILITIES

0.048

0.873

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCERS OF
THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

0.420

-0.044

0.827

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCES OF
THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

0.068

-0.263

-0.285

0.894

OUTSOURCING
PARTNERSHIP
PERFORMANCE

0.343

0.579

0.107

-0.087

0.840

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL CAPITAL
OF THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

0.288

-0.412

0.319

0.207

0.074

0.924

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL CAPITAL
OF THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

-0.174

0.116

-0.351

0.218

0.151

0.128
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STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL
CAPITAL OF
THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

0.667

TABLE 18: FIRST MEASUREMENT MODEL- CROSS LOADINGS

OUTSOURCING
PARTNERSHIP
PERFORMANCE

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL CAPITAL
OF THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

POTENTIAL
COMPLEMEN
TARITIES

LEARNING
DYNAMIC
CAPABILITIES

PC1

0.8173

0.0745

0.1943

0.2165

0.2384

0.1528

-0.1506

PC2

0.9297

0.0225

0.4853

-0.0395

0.3458

0.3203

-0.1569

DC1

0.0338

0.9022

0.0427

-0.4188

0.5701

-0.3674

0.1364

DC2

0.0527

0.8427

-0.1393

0.0057

0.4280

-0.3525

0.0586

R1_CPG

0.2075

0.0635

0.7568

-0.2668

-0.0755

0.2657

-0.3373

R2_CPG

0.3210

-0.0332

0.9024

-0.3594

0.1524

0.3896

-0.2439

R3_CPG

0.4734

-0.0567

0.9224

-0.2012

0.1253

0.2077

-0.4178

R4_CPG

0.2973

-0.0787

0.7037

-0.1517

0.0806

0.2346

-0.1252

R1_SMA

0.0787

-0.1801

-0.3454

0.9756

-0.0124

0.1739

0.1840

R2_SMA

0.0108

-0.2117

-0.1196

0.7628

-0.2514

0.0746

0.0797

R3_SMA

-0.0063

-0.2055

-0.3812

0.9186

-0.0931

0.1803

0.1434

R4_SMA

0.0297

-0.4277

-0.1394

0.9059

-0.2059

0.2916

0.2926

OPP1

0.4417

0.4241

0.3797

-0.0252

0.8166

0.0566

0.0065

OPP2

0.1972

0.6110

-0.0087

-0.3031

0.8723

0.0602

0.1374

OPP3

0.2168

0.3945

-0.1501

0.1865

0.8288

0.0724

0.2700

SC1_CPG

0.3081

-0.3435

0.4316

0.1020

0.0086

0.9095

0.0181

SC2_CPG

0.2315

-0.4124

0.1809

0.2668

0.1184

0.9381

0.2011

SC1_SMA

-0.2636

-0.0338

-0.5450

0.6650

-0.1328

-0.0280

0.2842

SC2_SMA

-0.2541

0.0743

-0.5181

0.4702

0.0563

0.0856

0.9001
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TASK-RELATED
RESOURCES OF
THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL
CAPITAL OF
THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCERS OF
THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

TABLE 19: FIRST MEASUREMENT MODEL- T-STATISTICS FOR ITEM
LOADINGS

POTENTIAL
COMPLEMENTA
RITIES

PC1

2.1414

PC2

4.8792

LEARNING
DYNAMIC
CAPABILITIES

DC1

8.1909

DC2

5.9907

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCERS OF
THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

R1_CPG

2.7428

R2_CPG

3.7903

R3_CPG

3.7536

R4_CPG

2.4068

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCES OF
THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

R1_SMA

1.9859

R2_SMA

1.9171

R3_SMA

2.0711

R4_SMA

2.1921

OUTSOURCING
PARTNERSHIP
PERFORMANCE

OPP1

2.9307

OPP2

3.7212

OPP3

3.2049

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL CAPITAL
OF THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

SC1_CPG

5.2514

SC2_CPG

6.2222

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL
CAPITAL OF
THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

SC1_SMA

0.9590

SC2_SMA

2.8420
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TABLE 20: SECOND MEASUREMENT MODEL- OVERVIEW

AVE

Composite
Reliability

R
Square

Cronbach`s
Alpha

POTENTIAL COMPLEMENTARITIES

0.7662

0.8672

0.2145

0.7077

LEARNING DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES

0.7624

0.8651

0.1819

0.6912

TASK-RELATED RESOURCES OF THE
OUTSOURCER (CPG)

0.6833

0.8950

0.8445

TASK-RELATED RESOURCES OF THE
OUTSOURCEE (SMA)

0.7993

0.9405

0.9387

OUTSOURCING PARTNERSHIP
PERFORMANCE

0.7049

0.8775

STRUCTURAL SOCIAL CAPITAL OF THE
OUTSOURCER (CPG)

0.8536

0.9210

0.8298

STRUCTURAL SOCIAL CAPITAL OF THE
OUTSOURCEE (SMA)

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000
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0.4335

0.7924

TABLE 21: SECOND MEASUREMENT MODEL- ITEM LOADINGS

POTENTIAL
COMPLEMENTA
RITIES

PC1

0.8175

PC2

0.9296

LEARNING
DYNAMIC
CAPABILITIES

DC1

0.8998

DC2

0.8457

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCERS OF
THE OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

R1_CPG

0.7569

R2_CPG

0.9024

R3_CPG

0.9224

R4_CPG

0.7036

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCES OF
THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

R1_SMA

0.9758

R2_SMA

0.7623

R3_SMA

0.9186

R4_SMA

0.9056

OUTSOURCING
PARTNERSHIP
PERFORMANCE

OPP1

0.8163

OPP2

0.8722

OPP3

0.8294

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL CAPITAL
OF THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

SC1_CPG

0.9093

SC2_CPG

0.9382

SC2_SMA

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL
CAPITAL OF
THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

1.0000
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TABLE 22: SECOND MEASUREMENT MODEL- CONSTRUCT
CORRELATIONS AND SQUARE ROOT AVES

POTENTIAL
COMPLEMENT
ARITIES

LEARNING
DYNAMIC
CAPABILITIES

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCERS OF
THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCES OF
THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

OUTSOURCING
PARTNERSHIP
PERFORMANCE

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL CAPITAL
OF THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

POTENTIAL
COMPLEMENTAR
ITIES

0.8754

LEARNING
DYNAMIC
CAPABILITIES

0.0484

0.8732

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCERS OF
THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

0.4196

-0.0447

0.8266

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCES OF
THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

0.0682

-0.2601

-0.2849

0.8940

OUTSOURCING
PARTNERSHIP
PERFORMANCE

0.3429

0.5780

0.1062

-0.0862

0.8396

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL CAPITAL
OF THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

0.2877

-0.4120

0.3186

0.2075

0.0741

0.9239

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL CAPITAL
OF THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

-0.2541

0.0742

-0.5181

0.4702

0.0566

0.0857

100

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL
CAPITAL OF
THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

1.0000

TABLE 23: SECOND MEASUREMENT MODEL- CROSS LOADINGS

OUTSOURCING
PARTNERSHIP
PERFORMANCE

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL
CAPITAL OF
THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

POTENTIAL
COMPLEMENTA
RITIES

LEARNING
DYNAMIC
CAPABILITIES

PC1

0.8175

0.0767

0.1943

0.2168

0.2387

0.1528

-0.1774

PC2

0.9296

0.0212

0.4853

-0.0397

0.3454

0.3203

-0.2556

DC1

0.0337

0.8998

0.0427

-0.4189

0.5697

-0.3674

0.0721

DC2

0.0529

0.8457

-0.1393

0.0060

0.4283

-0.3526

0.0562

R1_CPG

0.2075

0.0634

0.7569

-0.2669

-0.0757

0.2656

-0.4133

R2_CPG

0.3209

-0.0337

0.9024

-0.3594

0.1522

0.3895

-0.4816

R3_CPG

0.4734

-0.0584

0.9224

-0.2014

0.1248

0.2076

-0.5156

R4_CPG

0.2970

-0.0792

0.7036

-0.1522

0.0801

0.2345

-0.2745

R1_SMA

0.0788

-0.1773

-0.3454

0.9758

-0.0119

0.1739

0.4513

R2_SMA

0.0107

-0.2115

-0.1196

0.7623

-0.2516

0.0746

0.3182

R3_SMA

-0.0062

-0.2034

-0.3812

0.9186

-0.0929

0.1804

0.4332

R4_SMA

0.0297

-0.4263

-0.1394

0.9056

-0.2057

0.2916

0.4607

OPP1

0.4415

0.4225

0.3797

-0.0254

0.8163

0.0566

-0.1073

OPP2

0.1972

0.6099

-0.0087

-0.3027

0.8722

0.0602

0.0749

OPP3

0.2169

0.3962

-0.1501

0.1870

0.8294

0.0725

0.2101

SC1_CPG

0.3080

-0.3432

0.4316

0.1019

0.0085

0.9093

-0.0574

SC2_CPG

0.2314

-0.4127

0.1809

0.2669

0.1184

0.9382

0.1929

SC2_SMA

-0.2541

0.0742

-0.5181

0.4702

0.0566

0.0857

1.0000
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TASK-RELATED
RESOURCES OF
THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL CAPITAL
OF THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCERS OF
THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

TABLE 24: SECOND MEASUREMENT MODEL- T-STATISTICS FOR ITEM
LOADINGS

POTENTIAL
COMPLEMENTA
RITIES

PC1

1.9408

PC2

6.3148

LEARNING
DYNAMIC
CAPABILITIES

DC1

7.3332

DC2

8.2635

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCERS OF
THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

R1_CPG

2.7638

R2_CPG

3.3851

R3_CPG

3.1741

R4_CPG

1.9932

TASK-RELATED
RESOURCES OF
THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

R1_SMA

1.7927

R2_SMA

1.7889

R3_SMA

1.8919

R4_SMA

2.0978

OUTSOURCING
PARTNERSHIP
PERFORMANCE

OPP1

2.3102

OPP2

3.9252

OPP3

3.2860

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL CAPITAL
OF THE
OUTSOURCER
(CPG)

SC1_CPG

5.6086

SC2_CPG

5.5212

SC2_SMA

102

STRUCTURAL
SOCIAL
CAPITAL OF
THE
OUTSOURCEE
(SMA)

TABLE 25: COMMON METHOD BIAS- SIGNIFICANCE OF ITEM LOADINGS
(BOOTSTRAP OUTPUT)

Path Coefficients

Standard Error
(STERR)

T Statistics
(|O/STERR|)

DC1 <- DC1

1.000000

DC1 <- DYN

0.873996

0.080177

10.970799

DC1 <- COMMON

0.059213

0.461840

0.915364

DC2 <- DC2

1.000000

DC2 <- DYN

0.874403

0.038767

22.402852

DC2 <- COMMON

-0.003747

0.417499

0.237506

PC1 <- PC1

1.000000

PC1 <- POT.COMP

0.862232

0.109240

7.954797

PC1 <- COMMON

0.193696

0.335692

0.465274

R4_CPG <- R4_CPG

1.000000

R4_CPG <- RES_CPG

0.647075

0.214604

3.176545

R4_CPG <- COMMON

0.304888

0.435117

0.964169

R4_SMA <- R4_SMA

1.000000

R4_SMA <- RES_SMA

0.909336

0.079984

11.688357

R4_SMA <- COMMON

0.009200

0.641758

1.155156

R1_CPG <- R1_CPG

1.000000

R1_CPG <- RES_CPG

0.810849

0.089359

9.033750

R1_CPG <- COMMON

0.280607

0.557241

1.023095

R1_SMA <- R1_SMA

1.000000

R1_SMA <- RES_SMA

0.886173

0.102804

8.860751

R1_SMA <- COMMON

-0.072078

0.672110

1.155987

R2_CPG <- R2_CPG

1.000000

R2_CPG <- RES_CPG

0.909029

0.044001

20.705469

R2_CPG <- COMMON

0.363178

0.670076

1.108817

R2_SMA <- R2_SMA

1.000000

R2_SMA <- RES_SMA

0.859450

0.081579

10.775879

R2_SMA <- COMMON

-0.021773

0.626506

1.045757

R3_CPG <- R3_CPG

1.000000

R3_CPG <- RES_CPG

0.903187

0.037267

24.115823

R3_CPG <- COMMON

0.356010

0.597081

1.096021
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R3_SMA <- R3_SMA

1.000000

R3_SMA <- RES_SMA

0.937750

0.044985

21.145654

R3_SMA <- COMMON

-0.093485

0.690783

1.185247

OPP1 <- OPP1

1.000000

OPP1 <- PERFORM

0.752249

0.266668

2.990228

OPP1 <- COMMON

0.306178

0.371505

1.008763

OPP2 <- OPP2

1.000000

OPP2 <- PERFORM

0.884540

0.048385

17.857533

OPP2 <- COMMON

0.112182

0.483744

0.836911

OPP3 <- OPP3

1.000000

OPP3 <- PERFORM

0.881027

0.060233

14.278269

OPP3 <- COMMON

0.103748

0.416974

0.081472

SC1_CPG <- SC1-CPG

1.000000

SC1_CPG <- SOC_CPG

0.919863

0.046622

19.797470

SC1_CPG <- COMMON

0.307302

0.387834

0.404042

SC2_CPG <- SC2_CPG

1.000000

SC2_CPG <- SOC_CPG

0.926100

0.034042

27.197308

SC2_CPG <- COMMON

0.226416

0.335131

0.227928

SC2_SMA <- SC2_SMA

1.000000

SC2_SMA <- SOC_SMA

1.000000

SC2_SMA <- COMMON

-0.176029

0.581200

1.084855

PC2 <- PC2

1.000000

PC2 <- POT.COMP

0.878791

0.123373

7.213530

PC2 <- COMMON

0.335383

0.385671

1.039854
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TABLE 26: COMMON METHOD BIAS- COMPARISON OF AVERAGE “R
SQUARES”
FACTOR
CONSTRUCT INDICATOR LOADING(R1)
DC1
DYN
0.873996
DC2
0.874403
PC1
POT.COMP
0.862232
PC2
0.878791
R1_SMA
RES_SMA
0.886173
R2_SMA
0.85945
R3_SMA
0.93775
R4_SMA
0.909336
R1_CPG
RES_CPG
0.810849
R2_CPG
0.909029
R3_CPG
0.903187
R4_CPG
0.647075
OPP1
PERFORM
0.752249
OPP2
0.88454
OPP3
0.881027
SC2_SMA
SOC_SMA
1
SC1_CPG
SOC_CPG
0.919863
SC2_CPG
0.9261
0.873113889
AVERAGE
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R1 SQUARE
0.763869008
0.764580606
0.743444022
0.772273622
0.785302586
0.738654303
0.879375063
0.826891961
0.657476101
0.826333723
0.815746757
0.418706056
0.565878558
0.782411012
0.776208575
1
0.846147939
0.85766121
0.767831172

COMMON
METHOD
LOADING(R2)
0.059213
-0.003747
0.193696
0.335383
-0.072078
-0.021773
-0.093485
0.0092
0.280607
0.363178
0.35601
0.304888
0.306178
0.112182
0.103748
-0.176029
0.307302
0.226416

0.143938278

R2
SQUARE
0.003506179
0.00001404
0.03751814
0.112481757
0.005195238
0.000474064
0.008739445
0.00008464
0.078740288
0.13189826
0.12674312
0.092956693
0.093744968
0.012584801
0.010763648
0.030986209
0.094434519
0.051264205
0.04956279

TABLE 27: MAIN STRUCTURAL MODEL- PATH COEFFICIENTS,
STANDARD ERROR AND T-STATISTICS (BOOTSTRAP OUTPUT)

Path
Coefficients

Standard Error
(STERR)

T Statistics
(|O/STERR|)

POT.COMP -> PERFORM

0.290203

0.334276

0.944302

DYN -> PERFORM

0.514046

0.180715

3.114125

RES_CPG -> POT.COMP

0.452089

0.289667

1.649719

RES_SMA -> POT.COMP

0.186372

0.309247

0.660975

SOC_CPG -> DYN

-0.467874

0.251035

1.679060

SOC_SMA -> DYN

0.164189

0.225886

0.488515
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TABLE 28: R SQUARE VALUES OF MAIN AND MODERATOR ADDED
STRUCTURAL MODEL
Original Model

Moderator Added Model

R Square

R Square

POT.COMP 0.214475

POT.COMP 0.214471

DYN

0.181869

DYN

PERFORM 0.433538

0.181832

PERFORM 0.467839
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FIGURES
FIGURE 1: THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL

Outsourcer’s Resources

Potential Complementarities

Task-Related
•Financial
•Physical
•Human
•Informational
•Legal
Social Capital
•Structure
•Cognitive
•Relational

(+)

(+)

Performance

•Non-sticky pooled interdependence
•Sticky pooled interdependence
•Non-sticky sequential interdependence
•Sticky sequential interdependence
•Non-sticky reciprocal interdependence
•Sticky reciprocal interdependence
•Non-sticky integration interdependence
•Partially sticky integration interdependence
•Fully sticky integration interdependence
•Intense Interdependence

(+)

•Internally-oriented
•Competitor-centered
•Customer-focused

(+)

(+)

Outsourcee’s Resources
Task-Related
•Financial
•Physical
•Human
•Informational
•Legal

Dynamic Capabilities
•Learn
•Integrate
•Reconfigure
•Adapt
(+)

Social Capital
•Structure
•Cognitive
•Relational
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FIGURE 2: THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: FINAL SURVEY (SMA VERSION)

“Gains from Outsourcing Collaboration between CPG Manufacturers
and Sales and Marketing Agencies”
Dear SMA Executive:
The ASMC Foundation and Georgia State University are conducting an original Research Study to better
understand and improve the partnering capabilities between Sales and Marketing Agencies (SMAs) and
their manufacturing (CPG) clients. We are writing to request your participation in this important follow-up
Study to two previous Research Reports on outsourcing sponsored by ASMC Foundation referred to in the
next paragraph. The findings are expected to highlight the capabilities of SMAs, help grow their
businesses and make a stronger fact and research-based case for their servicesASMC Foundation was
a co-sponsor and Georgia State University was a research participant in the first two seminal SMA
outsourcing studies “The Value of Outsourcing” and “Outsourcing is In”, the Executive Summaries of
which can be found at the Foundation's website www.asmcfoundation.org. Participants in this Research
Study will be sent an Executive Summary of the findings for their use and business development.
While this Study is being sponsored by the ASMC Foundation, it is being conducted independently by
researchers at Georgia State University in order to guarantee anonymity and academic rigor. Your
individual responses will not be shared with anyone or identified in any reports. Only aggregate results will
be published. All data will be stored on secure servers at the university.
The Survey will take no more than 15 minutes of your time. We believe the Study findings will be of
significant value to your organization and the SMA community. As with any research project, there are no
right or wrong answers. Participation to the Survey is completely voluntary. Importantly, we want your
candid opinions and assessments. If you have any questions, please contact us at the below email addresses:
Dr.Naveen Donthu
Georgia State University
ndonthu@gsu.edu
404-413-7662

Mark Baum, President
ASMC Foundation
mbaum@asmcfoundation.org
571-321-2026

Barry Maloney, CFO
ASMC Foundation
bmaloney@asmcfoundation.org
202-293-1414

Thank you, in advance, for your participation. You can print this page for your records.
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DEFINITIONS
Please use the following definitions for all future questions in this study.
Headquarters Selling - covers activities such as development, presentation and execution of sales plans, development
and maintenance of key contacts at customer headquarters, achieving retailer acceptance of new items, planning of joint
marketing programs, and influencing favorable product placement.
Retail Services - covers retail support and merchandising activities including continuity coverage (product placement,
rotation, audits, etc), home store programs, new item cut ins, shelf management updates, out-of-stock identification,
and merchandising of promoted items.
Administrative Services - covers activities such as back office support, order management support, promotion and
deduction management support, post audit claim management support, and customer service.
Typical CPG - one of your top 5 manufacturing clients.
PART 1 - SMA and CPG RESOURCES
Please rate the degree your FIRM and your typical CPG utilize the following resources.

YOUR FIRM
Very
LO
W

Low

Avera
ge

Hig
h

Very
HIGH

1-Technological Resources to
perform:
-HEADQUARTERS SELLING











-RETAIL SERVICES









-ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES







2-Human Resources to perform:
-HEADQUARTERS
SELLING





CPG
Hig
h

Ver
y
HIG
H













































NonApplicab
le

Very
LOW

Low

























Average

NonApplicab
le

-RETAIL SERVICES

























-ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

























3-Managerial Expertise to
perform:
HEADQUARTERS SELLING

























-RETAIL SERVICES

























-ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

























4-Financial Resources to perform:
-HEADQUARTERS
SELLING

























-RETAIL SERVICES

























-ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
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PART 2 - SMA and CPG CHARACTERISTICS
Please state your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements about your
FIRM and your typical CPG (the same manufacturer you evaluated and named in the previous section).

Strongly
DISAGRE
E

Strongly
AGREE

NonApplicable





















-RETAIL SERVICES

























-ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

























2-Is characterized as being trustworthy by its
business partners (SMAs, CPGs and retail firms).

























3-Maintains competitive intelligence.

























4-Learns a lot from its interactions with its business
partners (SMAs, CPGs and retail firms).

























5-Has frequent meetings to reach an agreement
about its strategic business plans.

























6-All employees share the same organizational
vision and ambitions.

























7-Is dynamic and has a lot of flexibility in
customizing its activities.
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Agree

NonApplicable



Neither
Agree Nor
Disagree

Strongly
AGREE



Disagree

Agree

1-Can be relied upon to fulfill its responsibilities
for:
-HEADQUARTERS SELLING

Strongly
DISAGRE
E

Neither
Agree Nor
Disagree

CPG

Disagree

YOUR FIRM

PART 3 - PERFORMANCE
Headquarters selling, retail services and administrative services tasks consists of several activities. Please select which
best describes your typical arrangement with the CPG for each one of these 3 tasks.

We perform all the
activities

We performs some activities
and the CPG performs
others

We jointly perform all
activities with the CPG

Other

Headquarters Selling









Retail Services









Administrative Services









Now, please rate how successfully each one of these 3 tasks is performed with this CPG by using the above
arrangement you selected.

Very
Unsuccessfully
Headquarters Selling
Retail Services
Administrative
Services

Unsuccessfully

Neither
Successfully nor
Unsuccessfully

Very
Successfully

Successfully

NonApplicable





































Would you like to change the above arrangement you currently have for any of the 3 tasks below?

Never

Maybe

Unsure

Probably

Definitely

Non-Applicable

Headquarters Selling













Retail Services













Administrative Services
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PART 4 - PARTNERSHIP SATISFACTION
Please state your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements about the working
relationship of your OUTSOURCING PARTNERSHIP with the typical CPG (the manufacturer you evaluated in
previous section)

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

NonApplicable













2- Overall, we are satisfied.













3- Better than with other CPGs.













1- Could not be better.

PART 5 - PARTNERSHIP OUTCOMES
Please state your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements about your
OUTSOURCING PARTNERSHIP with this typical CPG.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

NonApplicable

1- We are keenly aware of our weaknesses, strengths,
gaps, and discontinuities.













2- We have acquired new critical capabilities or skills.













3- We work fast and meet deadlines.













4- Our partnership is dynamic and has a lot of
flexibility in customizing our services.













5- We are able to combine, recombine, and create new
business processes as needed.
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PART 6 - FUTURE ENVIRONMENT
Please rate the likelihood that the following will occur in the product lines you represent over the next 12 months.

Very
Unlikely

Unlikely

Neither
Likely
nor
Unlikely

Likely

Very
Likely

NonApplicable

1- Extensive changes in retail environment
(consolidation, new competition, etc.).













2- Major product innovations.













3-Key supply chain innovations.













4-Major changes in customer preferences.













PART 7 - SMA PROFILE
Please fill in the approximate:
1. Annual sales revenue of your firm in U.S. dollars ($): __________
2. Number of employees in your firm: ___________
3. Number of years your firm has represented this CPG: ________

PART 8 - CPG CONTACT
Please send the below e-mail to your contact at the CPG firm whom you evaluated in this questionnaire requesting their
participation in the study using the below link.

Dear ______________,
On behalf of my organization, we just participated in a Study on "Gains from Outsourcing Collaboration
between CPG Manufacturers and Sales and Marketing Agencies" conducted by ASMC Foundation and
Georgia State University. They would also like CPG companies like yours to participate in the Study. I encourage you
to click on the below link and take this short Survey (15 minutes).
http://www.surveyindustry.com/
Thank you.
_______________ (your name)
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APPENDIX B : FINAL SURVEY (CPG VERSION)

“Gains from Outsourcing Collaboration between CPG Manufacturers
and Sales and Marketing Agencies”
Dear CPG Executive:
The ASMC Foundation and Georgia State University are conducting an original Research Study to better
understand and improve the partnering capabilities between Sales and Marketing Agencies (SMAs) and
their manufacturing (CPG) clients. We are writing to request your participation in this important follow-up
Study to two previous Research Reports on outsourcing sponsored by ASMC Foundation referred to in the
next paragraph. The findings are expected to highlight the capabilities of SMAs to better serve their
CPG clients and make a stronger fact and research-based case for their services.
ASMC Foundation was a co-sponsor and Georgia State University was a research participant in the first
two seminal SMA outsourcing studies “The Value of Outsourcing” and “Outsourcing is In”, the
Executive Summaries of which can be found at the Foundation's website www.asmcfoundation.org.
Participants in this Research Study will be sent an Executive Summary of the findings for their use and
business development.
While this Study is being sponsored by the ASMC Foundation, it is being conducted independently by
researchers at Georgia State University in order to guarantee anonymity and academic rigor. Your
individual responses will not be shared with anyone or identified in any reports. Only aggregate results will
be published. All data will be stored on secure servers at the university.
The Survey will take no more than 15 minutes of your time. We believe the Study findings will be of
significant value to your organization and the CPG community. As with any research project, there are no
right or wrong answers. Participation to the Survey is completely voluntary. Importantly, we want your
candid opinions and assessments. If you have any questions, please contact us at the below email addresses:
Dr.Naveen Donthu
Georgia State University
ndonthu@gsu.edu
404-413-7662

Mark Baum, President
ASMC Foundation
mbaum@asmcfoundation.org
571-321-2026

Barry Maloney, CFO
ASMC Foundation
bmaloney@asmcfoundation.org
202-293-1414

Thank you, in advance, for your participation. You can print this page for your records.
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DEFINITIONS
Please use the following definitions for all future questions in this study.
Headquarters Selling - covers activities such as development, presentation and execution of sales plans, development
and maintenance of key contacts at customer headquarters, achieving retailer acceptance of new items, planning of joint
marketing programs, and influencing favorable product placement.
Retail Services - covers retail support and merchandising activities including continuity coverage (product placement,
rotation, audits, etc), home store programs, new item cut ins, shelf management updates, out-of-stock identification,
and merchandising of promoted items.
Administrative Services - covers activities such as back office support, order management support, promotion and
deduction management support, post audit claim management support, and customer service.
Typical SMA - one of your top 5 sales and marketing agencies.
PART 1 - SMA and CPG RESOURCES
Please rate the degree your FIRM and your typical SMA utilize the following resources.

YOUR FIRM
Very
LO
W

Low

Avera
ge

Hig
h

Very
HIGH

1-Technological Resources to
perform:
-HEADQUARTERS SELLING











-RETAIL SERVICES









-ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES







2-Human Resources to perform:
-HEADQUARTERS
SELLING





SMA
Hig
h

Ver
y
HIG
H













































NonApplicab
le

Very
LOW

Low

























Average

NonApplicab
le

-RETAIL SERVICES

























-ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

























3-Managerial Expertise to
perform:
HEADQUARTERS SELLING

























-RETAIL SERVICES

























-ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

























4-Financial Resources to perform:
-HEADQUARTERS
SELLING

























-RETAIL SERVICES

























-ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
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PART 2 - SMA and CPG CHARACTERISTICS
Please state your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements about your
FIRM and your typical SMA (the same sales and marketing agency you evaluated and named in the previous
section).

Strongly
DISAGRE
E

Strongly
AGREE

NonApplicable





















-RETAIL SERVICES

























-ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

























2-Is characterized as being trustworthy by its
business partners (SMAs, CPGs and retail firms).

























3-Maintains competitive intelligence.

























4-Learns a lot from its interactions with its business
partners (SMAs, CPGs and retail firms).

























5-Has frequent meetings to reach an agreement
about its strategic business plans.

























6-All employees share the same organizational
vision and ambitions.

























7-Is dynamic and has a lot of flexibility in
customizing its activities.

























PART 3 – PERFORMANCE
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Agree

NonApplicable



Neither
Agree Nor
Disagree

Strongly
AGREE



Disagree

Agree

1-Can be relied upon to fulfill its responsibilities
for:
-HEADQUARTERS SELLING

Strongly
DISAGRE
E

Neither
Agree Nor
Disagree

SMA

Disagree

YOUR FIRM

Headquarters selling, retail services and administrative services tasks consists of several activities. Please select which
best describes your typical arrangement with the SMA for each one of these 3 tasks.
We perform some activities
and the SMA performs
others

We perform all the
activities

We jointly perform all
activities with the SMA

Other

Headquarters Selling









Retail Services









Administrative Services









Now, please rate how successfully each one of these 3 tasks is performed with this SMA by using the above
arrangement you selected.

Very
Unsuccessfully
Headquarters Selling
Retail Services
Administrative
Services

Unsuccessfully

Neither
Successfully nor
Unsuccessfully

Very
Successfully

Successfully

NonApplicable





































Would you like to change the above arrangement you currently have for any of the 3 tasks below?

Never

Maybe

Unsure

Probably

Definitely

Non-Applicable

Headquarters Selling













Retail Services













Administrative Services
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PART 4 - PARTNERSHIP SATISFACTION
Please state your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements about the working
relationship of your OUTSOURCING PARTNERSHIP with the typical SMA (the sales and marketing agency you
evaluated in previous sections).
Neither
Agree
Strongly
nor
Strongly
NonDisagree Disagree Disagree Agree
Agree
Applicable












2- Overall, we are satisfied.













3- Better than with other SMAs.













1- Could not be better.

PART 5 - PARTNERSHIP OUTCOMES
Please state your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements about your
OUTSOURCING PARTNERSHIP with this typical SMA.
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

NonApplicable

1- We are keenly aware of our weaknesses, strengths,
gaps, and discontinuities.













2- We have acquired new critical capabilities or skills.













3- We work fast and meet deadlines.













4- Our partnership is dynamic and has a lot of
flexibility in customizing our services.













5- We are able to combine, recombine, and create new
business processes as needed.













PART 6 - FUTURE ENVIRONMENT
Please rate the likelihood that the following will occur in the product lines you represent over the next 12 months.
Neither
Likely
Very
nor
Very
Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely
Likely
Likely

NonApplicable

1- Extensive changes in retail environment
(consolidation, new competition, etc.).













2- Major product innovations.













3-Key supply chain innovations.













4-Major changes in customer preferences.













PART 7 - CPG PROFILE
Please fill in the approximate:
1. Annual sales revenue of your firm in U.S. dollars ($): __________
2. Number of employees in your firm: ___________
3. Number of years your firm has been represented by this SMA: ________
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